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Boston, MA 021161.   Introduction 
  The main goals of bank supervision are generally to act as a delegated monitor on behalf of insured 
depositors or other stakeholders, to protect the safety and soundness of the financial system, and to counteract the 
moral hazard incentives created by the government safety net.  However, changes in supervisory policy also may 
have significant effects on macroeconomic or regional economic health if banks respond by altering their lending 
behavior.  These additional effects may be intended or unintended.  For example, supervisors may intend that 
some risky institutions reduce their lending.  However, if too many institutions reduce their supplies of credit 
simultaneously, this may create an unintended credit crunch or recession.  Supervisors alternatively may try to 
stimulate lending through supervisory easing.  We discuss below some reasons to suspect that supervisory changes 
over the last decade or so may have had significant effects on the overall lending of the U.S. banking industry. 
  The purpose of this research is to investigate this possibility by testing three hypotheses about whether 
supervisors changed their policies and whether these policy changes affected bank lending behavior: 
 
H1: U.S. bank supervisors got “tougher” on banks during the “credit crunch period” of 1989-1992, treating banks 
of a given financial condition more harshly than in previous years. 
 
H2: U.S. bank supervisors got “easier” on banks during the “boom period” of 1993-1998, treating banks of a 
given financial condition less harshly than in prior periods. 
 
H3: Changes in supervisory toughness, if they did occur, changed bank lending behavior in the predicted 
directions. 
 
If these hypotheses are true, they may help explain part of the observed wide swings in aggregate bank lending to 
business during the 1990s, and may imply a larger role for financial supervision in the performance of the 
economy than was previously thought.  We test these hypotheses using information on the supervisory process, 
confidential data on classified assets and CAMEL ratings from bank examinations, bank balance sheet and income 
data, and other variables for the condition of the bank, its state, and its region over the period 1986-1998. 
  Although we test these hypotheses separately, they are all intertwined in the overall question of the effects 
of changes in supervision.  Hypotheses H1 (increase in toughness during the credit crunch) and H3 (it mattered to 
bank lending) are both necessary conditions for changes in bank supervision to have played a major role in causing 
the decline in lending and recession during credit crunch period.  Similarly, H2 (decline in toughness during the 
boom) and H3 (it mattered to bank lending) are necessary for changes in bank supervision to have played a major 
role in causing the increase in lending and economic expansion during the boom period.  Finally, if all three        2 
 
hypotheses are true, this may imply that supervisory actions have greater effects on the macroeconomy than is 
generally recognized. 
  To put these issues into context, we note that the period around 1989-1992 is often referred to as a “credit 
crunch” in the U.S., in which commercial banks substantially reduced their lending to business customers, 
although some researchers choose slightly different dates for the credit crunch period.  From 1989 to 1992, 
domestic commercial and industrial (C&I) loans held by U.S. banks fell by about 23% in real terms.  This decline 
may have been particularly difficult for bank-dependent small and medium-sized businesses, which often have few 
alternatives for external finance.  Rough estimates based on a sample of banks responding to the Federal Reserve’s 
Survey of Terms of Bank Lending are consistent with this presumption, suggesting declines in business loans to 
borrowers with bank credit less than $1 million on the order of 38% (Berger, Kashyap, and Scalise 1995).  
Surveys of small business owners also suggest that it was more difficult for these firms to obtain credit during the 
credit crunch period (e.g., Dunkelberg and Dennis 1992, Avery, Bostic, and Samolyk 1998). 
  A number of hypotheses for the decline in bank credit during the credit crunch period have been tested — 
including changes in bank capital requirements and other regulations - and the results are reviewed below.  Here 
we test one theory that has been suggested by the popular press, supervisory agencies, and academic researchers 
— that a combination of Hypotheses H1 (increase in supervisory toughness) and H3 (this toughness mattered to 
lending) may be at least partly responsible for the reduced lending (e.g., Bacon and Bleakley 1991, Syron 1991, 
Bizer 1993, Peek and Rosengren 1995a). 
  An increase in supervisory toughness could explain a reduction in lending as follows.  An unfavorable 
examination rating may be burdensome to a bank because supervisors often require poorly rated institutions to take 
costly actions to improve their condition (e.g., raising additional equity capital), or because poorly rated banks may 
be prohibited from engaging in some profitable activities by prompt corrective action rules or supervisory 
discretion.  Banks may try to reverse the supervisory burdens of an unfavorable rating by reducing their perceived 
risk, and one way to do so is to reduce lending. 
  This explanation may be broader than it first appears because it incorporates the changes in capital 
requirements and other regulatory changes during the credit crunch period to the extent that they were enforced 
through the supervisory process. That is, to the extent that risk-based capital requirements, leverage capital        3 
 
requirements, and other regulatory changes were enforced through the supervisory process by assigning worse 
CAMEL ratings for the same risk-based capital ratios, leverage capital ratios, or other balance sheet or income 
ratios, they may be captured by our tests. 
  In addition, more classified assets or more serious classifications from an unfavorable examination may 
force a bank to shift funds from equity to its allocation for loan and lease losses (ALLL).   Since equity counts in 
full as Tier 1 equity under risk-based capital guidelines and ALLL counts as only as Tier 2 capital up to 1.25% of 
risk-weighted assets, the shift may directly reduce regulatory capital and require the bank to reduce lending or 
shrink to comply with capital regulations. 
  There may also have been a reduction in supervisory toughness during the banking boom period of 1993-
1998, consistent with Hypothesis H2.  In 1993, the main federal supervisors of banks and thrifts (Office of the 
Comptroller of the Currency, Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Reserve Board, and Office of Thrift 
Supervision) formally recognized a problem of credit availability and began a joint program directed at dealing 
with this problem.  The program focused on five areas in which agencies would take actions designed to alleviate 
the apparent reluctance of the institutions to lend.  The program 1) removed impediments to lending to small and 
medium-sized businesses; 2) reduced appraisal requirements for real estate lending; 3) eased the appeals of 
examination decisions; 4) streamlined examination processes and procedures; and 5) reduced paperwork and 
regulatory burden associated with the supervisory process (Interagency Policy Statement on Credit Availability, 
March 10, 1993).  As a specific example of the implementation of this program, banks that were well- or adequately-
capitalized with satisfactory CAMEL ratings of 1 or 2 (most banks) were allowed to make and carry some loans to 
small- and medium-sized businesses (loans to borrowers with bank credit less than $900,000) with only minimal 
documentation, exempt from examiner criticism for doing so up to some limits (e.g., up to 20% of the bank’s capital). 
 Beyond these limits and for institutions not qualifying because of insufficient capital or CAMEL ratings, deviations 
from standard documentation could be made without examiner criticism for loans to some customers with past 
experience with the bank (Interagency Policy Statement on Documentation of Loans, March 30, 1993).  This policy 
may be interpreted as an easing of supervision that may increase lending to relationship-type small and medium-sized 
business borrowers.  In 1993, bank Call Report forms were also amended to begin collecting data each June on small 
business loans.        4 
 
  From 1993 through the end of our sample in 1998, lending by the U.S. banking industry increased 
substantially, and the industry enjoyed record profitability.  Total domestic C&I loans rose by about 50% in real 
dollars, more than recovering from its 23% drop during the credit crunch period.  However, small business loans 
may not have recovered quite as well, with business loans to borrowers with bank credit less than $1 million (as 
collected on the June Call Reports) rising only about 14% in real terms, and falling as a percentage of bank gross 
total assets from about 4.4% to about 3.8%.
1 
  A number of hypotheses for the improvements in bank profitability during the 1993-1998 boom period 
have been advanced, including favorable macroeconomic conditions, exercise of market power in pricing, a 
shifting toward higher risk-higher expected return investments, and improvements in the quality of banking 
services (Berger and Mester 1999, Berger, Bonime, Covitz, and Hancock 2000).  However, little attention has 
been paid to the possible role of changes in the supervisory process on bank lending behavior.  The increase in 
lending may have occurred in part because of the supervisors’ joint program or because supervisors became easier 
in their assessments of bank condition in other ways.  If banks were assigned more favorable CAMEL examination 
ratings and lower classified assets for a given financial condition, this may have encouraged banks to increase their 
lending.  To our knowledge, Hypotheses H2 (decline in toughness during the boom) and H3 (it mattered to bank 
lending) have not previously been tested using data from the boom period.  We test these hypotheses below and 
also investigate the effects of the supervisory ratings on other measures of bank risk taking. 
  To test for changes in supervisory toughness, we control for bank financial condition and other 
information that might be used by supervisors. To test H1, we run weighted least squares regression equations for 
classified assets and ordered logit equations for CAMEL ratings, and test whether supervisors classified more 
assets or assigned worse CAMEL ratings during the credit crunch period for a given bank financial condition and 
other factors describing its economic environment.  Similarly, to test H2, we test whether supervisors gave better 
treatment for given bank condition and other factors during the boom period. 
  To perform these tests, it is necessary to understand the supervisory process, particularly the procedures by 
which information is gathered and used by examiners.  In controlling for bank condition, our econometric models 
                                                 
1 These numbers may slightly overstate the growth in small business lending.  Although we are able to deflate the dollar 
values of loans to put them in real terms, the cutoff of bank credit less than $1 million remains in nominal terms on the Call 
Report form.        5 
 
mimic as closely as possible the information used in the supervisory process at the time of the ratings assignment, 
including the levels, trends, and peer group percentile ranks of all the key balance sheet and income variables 
specified in the off-site and on-site procedures.  It is important to include these variables, since if any of important 
Call Report items used by supervisors in setting the ratings is excluded from the econometric analysis, the test 
results may be biased.  For example, if a key balance sheet variable worsened during the credit crunch period and 
this were excluded from the ordered logit equations for CAMEL ratings, this may give a false reading of a 
toughening of supervisory treatment, since the CAMEL rating may have changed because of the excluded balance 
sheet ratio rather than a change in supervisory toughness.  This is especially important for the risk-based capital 
and leverage capital ratios, given the regulatory changes that apply to these ratios. 
  To test whether changes in supervisory toughness, if they occurred, affected bank lending behavior, we 
again control for bank conditions and economic environment.  To test H3, we run ordinary least squares regression 
equations for changes in the proportions of bank assets invested in different types of loans and test whether these 
were affected by changes in classified assets and CAMEL ratings.  We also include dependent variables for 
nonperforming loans, charge-offs, and the total capital ratio to determine whether any possible changes in 
supervisory toughness affected bank risk taking in ways other than the change in lending.  The regressors include 
three years of past changes in classified assets, changes in CAMEL ratings, changes in bank financial conditions, 
and changes in other factors. 
  By way of preview, we find that the data provides some statistically significant support for all three 
hypotheses, as well as supporting the argument that supervisory assessments affect bank risk-taking behavior.  
However, our evaluation of economic significance suggests that all of these effects are likely to be quite small.  
The data suggest that changes in supervisory toughness likely do not explain much of the dramatic changes in 
overall bank lending over the last decade or so. 
  Section 2 describes the supervisory process, including descriptions of the classified assets and CAMEL 
ratings assigned by supervisors and the off-site and on-site procedures used to arrive at these assessments.  Section 
3 looks at the raw data from bank examinations, illustrating how supervisory ratings have changed over time, and 
pointing out some sample selection issues.  Section 4 briefly reviews the literatures on the credit crunch and prior 
uses of supervisory data.  Section 5 presents the data and methodology employed.  Section 6 contains results and        6 
 
their implications, and Section 7 concludes. 
2.   The Supervisory Process 
  Current supervisory practice based on the FDIC Improvement Act of 1991 requires that banks be 
examined at least once every 12 months for most banks or at least every 18 months for some small banks in good 
condition, although prior practice often resulted in significantly lower frequency (Gilbert 1993, 1994).   
Examination frequency is generally higher for troubled banks — those that are perceived to be in poor condition 
based on off-site monitoring of their balance sheet ratios, past examination ratings, etc.  Supervisors also speed up 
the examination schedule when there are indications of fraud, embezzlement, or other criminal activity.  Most 
examinations are of the full-scope type, an in-depth evaluation of all areas of a bank's operation.  A limited-scope 
exam is less intensive than a full-scope but reviews the same areas, while a targeted exam focuses on one or two 
areas intensively.  In most cases, banks receive advance notification so that they can have the necessary documents 
and information prepared. 
  After the on-site examination, supervisory assessments in the form of CAMEL ratings and classified assets 
are determined.  However, much of the information used in the evaluation of the bank is gathered in advance off-
site.  In this section, we first describe the CAMEL ratings and classified assets, followed by discussions of the off-
site tasks and on-site procedures. 
2.1  CAMEL ratings and classified assets 
  Based on their assessments of information collected both off-site and on-site, supervisors assign each bank 
a composite CAMEL rating, which reflects their overall assessment of bank condition.  CAMEL ratings are 
integers ranging from 1 to 5, with 1 being the strongest condition and 5 being the weakest.  Most banks have 
ratings of 1 or 2 and are considered to be in satisfactory condition.  Banks with ratings of 3, 4, or 5 are generally 
encouraged or required to take actions to improve their conditions.  Table 1 gives more complete descriptions of 
the composite ratings.  The CAMEL ratings are confidential, although some of the research reviewed below 
suggests that the information in ratings changes becomes incorporated into market prices. 
  For most of our sample, the composite CAMEL rating was based on five components of supervisory 
concern, each of which also receive a rating on the 1 to 5 scale.  These are capital adequacy (C), asset quality (A), 
management (M), earnings (E), and liquidity (L).  Since 1997, supervisors have added a component for sensitivity        7 
 
to market risk (S), and altered the acronym to CAMELS.  While we do use the CAMELS rating for the end of our 
data set, we continue to refer to the CAMEL acronym throughout for convenience.  Table 2 gives some of the 
details about these components. 
  The other main assessment made by supervisors is the determination of classified assets.  In order from 
highest quality to lowest quality, C&I and commercial real estate loans are rated as “pass,” “special mention,” 
“substandard,” “doubtful,” or “loss.”.  Assets in the three most severe categories are often referred to as “classified 
assets,” although this term is sometimes meant to include the special mention category.  Table 3 gives definitions 
of the special mention, substandard, doubtful, and loss categories. 
  Examiners use the following formula to determine the minimum required level of the allocation for loan 
and lease losses (ALLL), which is based on probability of default for each asset classification: 
 
15%*substandard assets + 50%*doubtful assets + 100%*loss assets + (discretionary %)*(pass + special mention), 
 
 
where the discretionary percentage the bank is required to hold against nonclassified assets is usually about 1% to 
2%.  If this minimum level exceeds the bank's actual reserve, the bank must add to its reserve from equity capital.  
Thus, the greater the fraction of assets classified as substandard, doubtful, or loss, and the more serious the 
classification, the more the bank may have to shift funds from equity to ALLL.  This may require the bank to 
reduce lending, shrink, or raise capital to comply with capital regulations. 
    In our empirical analysis, we use both total classified assets (substandard + doubtful + loss) and weighted 
classified assets (15%*substandard assets + 50%*doubtful + 100%*loss).  An increase in supervisory toughness 
may occur by supervisors shifting loans from pass or special mention to substandard, doubtful, or loss, which 
would raise total classified assets.  Alternatively, supervisors might get tougher by shifting already-classified assets 
into more serious classifications, such as from substandard to doubtful or from doubtful to loss, which would raise 
weighted classified assets.  We include both measures of classified assets in our analysis to allow for these 
possibilities. 
2.2  Off-site supervisory tasks 
  In general, one individual is named "Examiner-in-Charge" (EIC) responsible for coordinating most 
aspects of an exam, and has a number of assistants depending on the size and complexity of the bank.  Prior to an        8 
 
on-site visit, examiners perform several analyses off-site.  These include review of past examination reports and 
the correspondence file for that bank, as well as its Call Report and Uniform Bank Performance Report (UBPR).  
The UBPR, produced for every U.S. commercial bank by the Federal Financial Institutions Examination Council, 
summarizes several years of Call Report data for a bank and presents both dollar amounts and financial ratios for 
most areas of bank operations.  The UBPR also includes information on the trends of these variables as well as the 
peer group average for each variable and the bank's rank within its peer group for that variable.  Peer groups are 
based on bank asset size, number of offices, and location in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area.  Analysis of 
the UBPR provides initial evaluations of the individual components of the CAMEL rating (although no 
preliminary rating is given for the management component), which may be changed during the on-site examination 
if conditions are not consistent with what was reported or expected (Commercial Bank Examination Manual 
1020.1 p.1). Generally, the off-site monitoring is helpful in determining potential problems that examiners should 
scrutinize during the on-site visit, allowing on-site resources to be allocated more efficiently.  Off-site monitoring 
is also useful for identifying troubled banks or those with indications of criminal activity to speed up the 
examination schedule for these institutions. 
  Our econometric models control for bank condition by proxying for  the information used by supervisors 
as well as possible.  This includes forming the levels, trends, and peer group percentile ranks of the key balance 
sheet and income variables specified in the UBPR from the appropriate Call Report quarter.  As discussed, failure 
to include these variables could bias our tests of Hypotheses H1 or H2 that supervisors got tougher or easier, since 
any change in classified assets or CAMEL ratings may reflect changes in the UBPR variables, rather than changes 
in supervisory harshness.  
2.3  On-site examination procedures 
  The most important aspect of the on-site examination is the evaluation of the bank's loan portfolio.  This 
process begins with a review of the institution's loan policies, which should include a description of the bank's 
market, targeted customers, lending guidelines, documentation, and restrictions or requirements on loans to 
insiders.  Examiners also read the minutes of the bank's loan committee meetings, the credit department's 
procedures and files regarding the acquisition of borrower financial information, and internal reports on past due 
or problem loans.        9 
 
  Examiners evaluate a certain proportion of the loan portfolio, depending on the bank's most recent 
composite and asset quality ratings.  This proportion ranges from 40% for banks with composite ratings of 1 or 2 
and an asset quality rating of 1 up to 60% or more for banks with worse ratings or other areas of concern. 
  There are several steps in determining the loan sample.  Examiners must review all commercial and 
industrial (C&I) and commercial real estate (CRE) loans that are past due, nonaccrual, restructured, renegotiated, 
made to an insider, internally classified by the bank or classified at the last exam.  "Large" loans, those loans 
greater than a dollar cutoff determined by the EIC to be appropriate for the bank, must also be reviewed.  This set 
of C&I and CRE loans is considered the "core" group for review.  To achieve the desired coverage of the portfolio 
(i.e., the 40% to 60% or more), additional loans are selected for review in a variety of ways.  The dollar cutoff for 
"large" loans might be lowered; recent loans or specific loan types might be selected; or random sampling or some 
other technique may be applied, according to examiner discretion. 
  Examiners assign ratings of pass, special mention, substandard, doubtful, or loss to each loan sampled.  
Examiners may assign distinct classifications to different parts of a loan depending on the likelihood of collection 
of each particular part.  Examiners may also assign split classifications, such as "substandard/doubtful," in 
appropriate circumstances.  The loan ratings are checked against the bank’s own internal ratings as a check of how 
well bank management is monitoring its own portfolio.  Installment loans, residential mortgages, and other 
consumer credits are classified based as pass, substandard, or loss based solely on the number of days past due, not 
by examiner discretion. 
  After the examination, the final supervisory assessments are made.  The composite CAMEL rating is 
based on all the components of supervisory concern — capital adequacy, asset quality, management, earnings, 
liquidity, and (more recently for the CAMELS rating) sensitivity to market risk — and the information 
incorporated into the rating comes from the data gathered off-site and on-site.  The composite CAMEL rating is 
not an unweighted mean of these components — an examiner may use personal judgment as to the importance of 
each component for a particular bank.  However, quality of the assets in terms of likely future losses and the ability 
of the bank’s capital to absorb these losses are usually the most important components.  The composite rating is 
generally not supposed to be more than one rank better than the capital (C) or asset quality (A) rank. 
3.   A Look at the Raw Data from Bank Examinations        10 
 
  Table 4 shows some summary statistics from bank examinations over the entire 1986 to 1998 period.  
Panel A shows the number of banks with examination data for each year, the mean ratios of total classified assets 
to loans and weighted classified assets to loans, the mean composite CAMEL rating, and the fractions of banks 
receiving composite CAMEL ratings of 1, 2, 3, 4, and 5.  Panel B of Table 4 summarizes the information for the 
pre-crunch, credit crunch, and boom periods. The accompanying figure plots the fractions of banks with the 
different CAMEL ratings over time. 
  We include exactly one observation for each bank that was examined in each year.  Since not every bank 
is examined in every year, the total number of banks examined in each year is fewer than the number of banks in 
the nation.  In the relatively infrequent cases in which more than one examination was made of the same bank in 
the same year, we simply include the results of the final examination of the year to avoid double-counting. As will 
be seen, changes over time in the sample of banks that were selected by supervisors to be examined are important 
in interpreting the data. 
  In some respects, the raw data are consistent with expectations, and in other respects, the data are quite 
surprising.  Consistent with expectations, the supervisory assessments are unambiguously the best during the boom 
periodcommonly assumed.  As shown in Panel A, in each of the boom period years 1993-1998, the mean total 
classified asset ratio, mean weighted classified asset ratio, mean composite CAMEL rating, and fraction of banks 
receiving CAMEL 1 ratings (the best rating) were better than the corresponding figures for each of the credit 
crunch years 1989-1992, and better than each of the pre-crunch years 1986-1988 as well.  The data in Panel B 
show that on average during the boom period, the classified asset ratios were on the order of about half, and the 
fractions of banks assigned CAMEL 1s were on the order of about double, those in the pre-crunch and credit 
crunch periods.  The figure shows a steep increase in CAMEL 1 ratings and steep decreases in CAMEL 3, 
CAMEL 4, and CAMEL 5 beginning in 1993.  These strong improvements in supervisory assessments during the 
boom period may reflect the improved condition of banks, any supervisory easing that may have occurred, or a 
combination of the two.  The multivariate empirical analysis below will try to disentangle these effects. 
  Contrary to expectations, the supervisory assessments generally did not deteriorate during the credit 
crunch period.  As shown in Panel A, in each of the credit crunch years 1989-1992, the mean total classified asset 
ratio, mean weighted classified asset ratio, mean composite CAMEL rating, and CAMEL 1 fraction were better        11 
 
than the corresponding figures for each of the pre-crunch years 1986-1988 (although the figures for 1989 are very 
close to those for 1988 and round to the same three digits for the classified asset ratios).  The data in Panel B show 
that the mean classified asset ratios, mean composite CAMEL, and CAMEL 1 fraction for the credit crunch period 
are all closer to the pre-crunch period figures than to the boom period figures, indicating a much smaller 
improvement in credit crunch period than in the boom period.  This slight improvement in supervisory 
assessments or failure to deteriorate is surprising given both the recession of the early 1990s and widespread belief 
that supervisors may have become tougher, as formulated in our Hypothesis H1.
2 
  At first blush, it would seem unlikely that Hypothesis H1 could be supported in our empirical analysis, in 
which we include controls for bank financial condition and economic environment.  Banking industry condition 
did improve slightly during the credit crunch period in terms of capital ratios and problem loans, but it would not 
be expected ex ante that controls for bank condition would improve enough to more than offset a substantial 
increase in supervisory toughness.  As seen next, the improvements in supervisory assessments during the credit 
crunch period may largely be an artifact of changes in the selection of banks that were examined. 
  Table 5 illustrates the sample selection issue by comparing examined banks with the banking industry as a 
whole over time.  As shown in Panel A, the fraction of banks with examination data rises each year from 1986 to 
1993 and then falls each year thereafter to 1998.  The changes are quite dramatic, with the percentage of banks 
with recorded examinations nearly doubling from 42.6% to 85.4%, and then dropping to 62.3%. As shown in 
Panel B of Table 5, only 49.4% of banks have examination data on average during the pre-crunch years versus 
69.5% during the credit crunch years and 75.4% during the boom years.  These dramatic changes in the fraction of 
banks examined may in part reflect changes in supervisory policy, changes in regulation (such as FDICIA, which 
mandates examinations every 12 or 18 months), or changes in bank condition. 
  Importantly, a change in the fraction of banks examined may change the quality pool of the banks 
examined relative to the industry as a whole.  As discussed above, the selection of which banks are examined in a 
given year depends in part on the perceived quality of the institutions.  Banks that are perceived to be in worse 
condition based on off-site monitoring of their balance sheet ratios, past examination ratings, etc., are more likely 
                                                 
2The classified assets figures may have been held down temporarily for some banks during the high-bank-failure years in the 
late 1980s and early 1990s in order to allow for orderly bank closures, since high classified assets may have reduced capital 
to below closure levels for too many banks at the same time.        12 
 
to be examined in a given year.  As a consequence, if the fraction of banks examined rises over time it may be 
expected that average quality of the pool of banks that are examined will rise relative to the industry as a whole, as 
better-quality institutions are added to the examination pool.  That is, there may be no improvement or even a 
deterioration in supervisory assessments on average relative to prior examinations, but the addition of better banks 
to the examination pool make it appear from the raw data that assessments have improved.  This may help explain 
why the classified asset ratios and CAMEL ratings of examined banks improved during the credit crunch period.  
The substantial expansion in the fraction of banks examined may have added better-quality banks that typically 
receive better supervisory assessments, as opposed to improved assessments of the same pool of banks. 
  Additional data in Table 5 are designed to examine this issue further.  The table shows the mean total 
capital ratio and mean nonperforming loan ratio calculated from the Call Report for the year prior to the 
examinations versus these same ratios for the industry as a whole.  For the total capital ratio, the difference 
between the mean for examined banks and the mean for the industry narrows considerably during the credit crunch 
period.  As shown in Panel A, the capital ratio for examined banks is 2.4 percentage points lower on average than 
the industry as of 1986, and this difference narrowed to below 1 percentage point by 1990.  As shown in Panel B, 
the average difference fell by about one-half from 1.9 percentage points during the pre-crunch years to 0.9 
percentage points during the credit crunch years, consistent with the argument that examinations during the credit 
crunch period tended to cover a higher-quality cut of the industry than did examinations during the pre-crunch 
period, which may explain the slightly improved supervisory assessments.  Similar results hold for other capital 
ratios (not shown in table).
3  Perhaps surprisingly, there is much less support for this argument from the 
nonperforming loan data — examined banks had only slightly higher nonperforming loan ratios than the industry 
as a whole during the pre-crunch period, and the difference disappeared during the credit crunch period.
4  Thus, 
the examination pool seemed to have improved substantially relative to the industry in terms of capital, but much 
less so in terms of nonperforming loans. 
                                                 
3 The mean Tier 1 and leverage capital ratios for examined banks improved from 0.149 and 0.082, respectively, during the 
pre-crunch years to 0.160 and 0.087 during the credit crunch years.  For the industry, the corresponding ratios increased from 
0.168 and 0.086, respectively, to 0.170 and 0.089.  Again, the percentage point difference in capital ratios between examined 
banks and the industry as a whole dropped by about one-half in the credit crunch period. 
4 A potential problem with the nonperforming loan data is that the definition may have changed slightly over time due to 
changes in supervisory policy in which loans in which no repayments had been missed were recorded as nonperforming.  
Similarly, there may have been a change in the reported data for C&I and real estate loans, as supervisors became more        13 
 
  Table 6 rearranges the raw data in a way that should at least partially offset the changes in sample 
selection over time.  For each examination, we show the changes in composite CAMEL ratings, total classified 
asset ratio, and weighted classified asset ratio since the previous examination.  If a bank did not have an 
examination in the year or if there are no prior examinations available, the data are excluded (this is for illustrative 
purposes only – we include banks with missing past examinations in our empirical analysis below).  This 
procedure should partially offset the sample selection problem, since each examination is paired with exactly one 
prior examination of the same bank, with no additions or subtractions to the data set.  As shown, there are very few 
observations at the start of the sample, since we have data on only a very small number of examinations prior to 
the start of the pre-crunch period in 1986.  The data are roughly consistent with the expectations that supervisory 
assessments deteriorated during the credit crunch period and improved during the boom period.  As shown in 
Panel A, CAMEL downgrades exceed upgrades in the first three years of the credit crunch period from 1989 
through 1991, and CAMEL upgrades exceed downgrades in every year from 1992 through 1997 (upgrades, 
downgrades, and constant CAMEL ratings fractions sum to 1 by construction).  Similarly, the percentage of 
examinations with increases in classified assets is relatively high in 1989 through 1991 and then falls off sharply 
in the immediately following years (classified asset ratio decreases and increases fractions sum to 1 by 
construction).  The summary data in Panel B confirm this.  During the credit crunch period, composite CAMEL 
downgrades slightly exceed upgrades, whereas upgrades slightly exceed downgrades during the pre-crunch years 
and upgrades greatly exceed downgrades during the boom years.  Similarly, the fractions of examinations with 
increases in the classified asset ratios are greatest during the credit crunch years, whereas the fractions with 
decreases in these ratios is highest during the boom years.  The data in Table 6 suggest that supervisory 
assessments began to be somewhat harsher just before the onset of the credit crunch and began to be somewhat 
less harsh just before the onset of the banking boom.  These data are also consistent with our arguments about 
sample selection.  It may be the case that on average banks of a given quality received worse supervisory 
assessments in the credit crunch period than in the pre-crunch period, but that the average assessments given 
improved because the increased examination frequency resulted in a better-quality cut of the industry being 
examined during the credit crunch period.  
                                                                                                                                                                  
vigilant in requiring that commercial loans secured by real estate were reported as real estate loans.        14 
 
  There are several other sample selection issues as well.  There may be some missing observations — 
examinations that took place but were not on the electronic files — particularly at the beginning of our data set.  
Prior to 1986, the files are very incomplete, making lagged examination data an issue.  Some of the data may also 
be missing for 1986 or other early years.  We also may be missing some examinations from 1998 that were not 
finalized at the time we extracted the data set in the latter part of 1999.  In addition, some banks drop out of the 
sample due to mergers and failures, and others enter the sample through the creation of new charters. 
  We deal with these sample selection issues in the empirical analysis in several ways.  First, we include a 
large number of controls for bank quality, which may help compensate for changes over time in the quality of the 
cut of the industry that is examined.  Second, we include observations in the regressions even when data for lagged 
supervisory assessments are missing, and include a dummy variable flagging these observations to account for the 
average difference of these banks from other banks.  This increases representation for new entrants and for banks 
near the beginning of the data set when examination data are sparse.  Third, we try a Heckman correction for 
sample selection bias, although we acknowledge that there are identification problems with this procedure in our 
case. 
4.   Literature Review 
  In this section, we first briefly review the literature on the causes for the decline in bank lending during 
the credit crunch period.  Very little of this research has used supervisory data, despite the widespread belief 
discussed above that an increase in supervisory toughness may be responsible for the reduced lending.  We then 
review prior research that has used the supervisory data to test the timeliness and accuracy of supervisory 
assessments.  To our knowledge there have been no prior tests of whether a decline in supervisory toughness may 
have contributed to changes in bank lending behavior during the banking boom. 
4.1  Prior research on the causes of the credit crunch 
  A number of hypotheses of the decline in bank credit to business during the credit crunch period have 
been tested.  A few studies have explicitly investigated forms of Hypotheses H1 and H3, i.e., that supervisors got 
tougher and this toughness reduced business lending.  In the study closest in approach to the current paper, Bizer 
(1993) ran ordered logit equations for composite CAMEL ratings on a limited number of Call Report items, 
regional dummies, and primary supervisor dummies.  He found that the model predicted tougher CAMEL ratings        15 
 
during the quarters of the credit crunch period than in a single-quarter control period of 1988Q4.  He also 
regressed lending on lagged CAMEL ratings and a few control variables and found that worse CAMEL ratings 
were associated with reduced lending. 
  While this was an excellent early attempt, a more comprehensive approach is needed in our opinion.  As 
discussed above, it is important to control for as much of the information used in the supervisory process at the 
time of the ratings assignment, including the levels, trends, and peer group percentile ranks of the key balance 
sheet and income variables explicitly used to form the CAMEL ratings, or else biases may be created.  Bizer’s 
CAMEL equations include very few of the specified levels, and none of the trends or peer group percentile ranks.  
For example, he excluded the risk-based capital ratios, so the effects of enforcing these regulatory requirements 
through the supervisory process may not be captured.  Similar criticisms also apply to the lending regressions, 
which do not control for problem loan categories.  As indicated below, our strongest results for the lending 
equations are generated by changes in classified assets, which are excluded from Bizer’s analysis.  As shown 
below, we also include much more information about the condition of banks in the same state and use a three-year 
pre-crunch base period in place of a single quarter. 
  Another study that used supervisory assessments was Peek and Rosengren (1995a).   These authors tested 
a form of Hypothesis H3 by evaluating the effects of supervisory enforcement actions in New England during the 
credit crunch period.  They found that banks under enforcement actions reduced lending more than other banks in 
the same region with the same capital-to-asset ratios, supporting the hypothesis that supervisory actions 
contributed to the reduction in lending.  Again, the conclusions may be somewhat limited, because there were very 
few control variables specified for bank condition, making it difficult to disentangle supervisory actions from the 
effects of the condition of the banks’ portfolios. 
  A number of studies tested whether implementation of tougher capital standards contributed to the decline 
in U.S. bank lending to business during the credit crunch period.  Some tested the effects of implementation of the 
Basle-Accord risk-based capital standards (e.g., Haubrich and Wachtel 1993, Berger and Udell 1994, Hancock 
and Wilcox 1994a, Wagster 1999).  Others tested whether supervisors or regulators implemented higher explicit or 
implicit regulatory capital standards based on leverage ratios (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994, Peek and Rosengren 
1994, 1995b, Hancock and Wilcox 1994a, Hancock, Laing, and Wilcox 1995, Shrieves and Dahl 1995).         16 
 
Although there is not full consensus, the empirical results generally do not support risk-based capital as a major 
contributor to the lending slowdown, but do provide some support for the effects of tougher explicit or implicit 
leverage capital requirements. 
  As noted above, to the extent that capital requirements or other regulatory changes are enforced through 
the supervisory process by assigning worse CAMEL ratings for the same capital ratio or other balance sheet or 
income ratios, they may be captured in our tests of supervisory toughness below.  That is, if supervisors are 
enforcing higher capital ratios, then there should be a worse CAMEL rating assigned for the same capital ratio, all 
else equal.  In our empirical analysis, we include the Tier 1 and Total risk-based capital ratios as well as the 
leverage ratio to capture these effects, although identifying these individual capital effects is quite difficult and is 
not a goal of this paper. 
  A notable advantage of our tests is that by including actual supervisory assessments, we can better 
distinguish between supervisory-induced changes in bank behavior and voluntary changes in bank behavior.  It is 
possible that a reduction in lending during the credit crunch period by banks with capital below the regulatory 
minimums represents a voluntary retrenchment of risks by banks, rather than the effects of changes in 
regulation/supervision, and our tests may help distinguish among these alternatives. 
  Similarly, some studies found that during the credit crunch period, banks facing greater portfolio risks — 
such as those with more nonperforming loans or those in nations with more banking system risk — also tended to 
cut back their lending more than other banks (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994, Wagster 1999).  Without supervisory 
information, it is not possible to distinguish whether this represents supervisory versus voluntary reactions to risk.  
Our tests, which control for measures of portfolio risks, may help distinguish between supervisory and voluntary 
changes. 
    Other studies tested whether demand or supply factors other than regulatory/supervisory changes   
contributed significantly to the change in lending during the credit crunch period.  Tests have been performed of 
the effects of the depletion of bank capital from loan loss experiences of the late 1980s (e.g., Peek and Rosengren 
1994, 1995b, Hancock and Wilcox 1994a, 1997, 1998), potential choices of lower risk profiles by bank managers 
(e.g., Hancock and Wilcox 1993, 1994b), reduced loan demand because of macroeconomic or regional recessions 
(e.g., Bernanke and Lown 1991, Hancock and Wilcox 1993, 1997), or a secular decline in the demand for bank        17 
 
loans because of the growth of alternative sources of credit (e.g., Berger and Udell 1994).  All of these hypotheses 
were supported to at least some degree.  
4.2  Prior research on supervisory timeliness and accuracy   
  Previous research on bank examinations or bank holding company inspections has usually focused on 
either the timeliness or accuracy of supervisory assessments of banking organization condition measured relative 
to market assessments.  Studies of timeliness generally tested whether changes in supervisory assessments — 
changes in CAMEL, changes in BOPEC (the corresponding rating for bank holding companies), or identification 
of problem banks — occurred before or after changes in market assessments of banking problems — equity or 
debt price changes, changes in bond ratings, or changes in share ownership by institutions or insiders. 
  Most of the early studies of timeliness found that supervisors did not have information in a more timely 
fashion than market participants.  Pettway (1980) performed event studies for six large banks that were placed on 
the "problem bank list" during 1972-1976, and found significantly negative cumulative abnormal stock returns 
before the examination that first recognized the banks' problems, suggesting a timeliness advantage for investors 
over supervisors.  Hirschhorn (1987) investigated whether CAMEL rating changes pre-date stock price changes, 
using data on examination ratings of the lead banks of the 15 largest BHCs during 1978-1987.  He found that 
CAMEL ratings were approximately contemporaneously correlated with abnormal returns, suggesting that 
supervisors generally have little if any economically significant informational advantage over equity market 
participants.  Cargill (1989) examined cross-sectional variation in the rates on large certificates of deposit for 58 
large banks during 1984-1986.  He found that CAMEL ratings added no significant explanatory power beyond 
Call Report financial ratios, again implying that supervisors did not have substantial information prior to market 
participants. 
  In contrast, more recent studies generally found that supervisors did have some valuable information on a 
more timely basis than market participants.  Simons and Cross (1991) identified 22 BHCs whose lead banks had 
their composite CAMEL rating lowered to the problem ratings of 4 or 5 during 1981-1987.  They found that the 
company's weekly abnormal stock returns for the year preceding the downgrade were equally likely to be positive 
or negative, and that few news stories chronicled the firms' problems, suggesting that supervisors may have known 
about problems before market participants.  Berger and Davies (1998) used event study methodology to identify        18 
 
abnormal BHC stock returns after 390 lead bank examinations during 1985-1989.  They separated out the three 
types of information that may be generated by the examination — private information about bank condition, 
certification information about the quality of audited financial statements, and supervisory discipline information 
about whether the bank may have greater or fewer restrictions placed on it.  They found that the only type of 
private information that was transferred to the market was unfavorable private information about bank condition, 
suggesting that supervisors force the release of unfavorable information.  Jordan (1999) found results consistent 
with these when investigating the effects of examinations of banks in 35 BHCs in New England over the period 
1988:Q1 – 1990:Q3.  He found statistically significant negative abnormal stock returns (below the mean returns of 
these 35 BHCs) in the quarter after CAMEL downgrades involving at least one-third of the BHCs’ banking assets, 
but no significant change in market prices for examinations overall.  DeYoung, Flannery, Lang, and Sorescu 
(1998) investigated whether national bank examiners’ private information significantly predicted changes in the 
risk premia on large BHCs’ subordinated debentures during 1989-1995.  They found that debenture yield spreads 
changed after the examination information, suggesting that examiners uncover relevant information before the 
market.  Consistent with Berger and Davies (1998), this predictive effect occurred only for negative supervisory 
assessments.  Flannery and Houston (1999) evaluated the correspondence between market and book valuations for 
a sample of BHCs in the fourth quarters of 1988 and 1990, and found that investors evaluated financial 
information differently when the BHC had recently received an on-site inspection, particularly in the relatively 
"normal" 1988 period.  Inspected BHCs showed a closer correspondence between market and book values, 
consistent with the hypothesis that investors view examiners as credibly certifying of the financial statements' 
accuracy.  Finally, Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) used quarterly data from inspections of 184 large bank 
holding companies over the period 1989:Q4-1992:Q2, and found that BHC supervisors and bond rating agencies 
both have some timely prior information that is useful to the other.  However, supervisory assessments and equity 
market indicators were not strongly related to each other, presumably because of differences in incentives 
regarding risks and expected returns.
5,6 
                                                 
5Consistent with this conclusion, Hall, Meyer, and Vaughan (1997) found that supervisors and shareholders responded 
differently to balance sheet measures of BHC condition. 
 
6 Studies of bank "early warning" systems (e.g., Sinkey 1978, Whalen and Thompson 1988, O’Keefe and Dahl 1997) tested 
how well supervisory ratings can be predicted from publicly available information, generally Call Report data.  These may be 
viewed as tests of whether supervisors have information not already in the publicly available data, although this was not the        19 
 
  Studies of supervisory accuracy generally tested whether changes in supervisory assessments added to the 
predictions of changes in bank condition (e.g., bank failure, book-value insolvency, changes in nonperforming 
loans or equity capital) or macroeconomic performance beyond other public or private sources of information 
(e.g., market assessments, Call Report information, or Federal Reserve staff forecasts).  This literature found 
mixed results.  Davies (1993) tested whether CAMEL or BOPEC ratings versus market/book ratios better helped 
predict future book-value insolvency (bank’s capital ratio below either 2% or 3% of assets) during 1986-1991 and 
found that unsatisfactory bank CAMEL ratings helped predict a higher probability of book-value insolvency, but 
that unsatisfactory holding company BOPEC ratings had little or no additional predictive power.  Cole and 
Gunther (1998) compared supervisory ratings with Call Report information in predicting future bank failures 
during 1988:Q2-1992:Q1, and found that CAMEL ratings improved forecast accuracy, but only if the examination 
was in the most recent two quarters.  Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) similarly found that supervisory 
assessments are much less accurate overall than both bond and equity market assessments in predicting future 
changes in performance, but that supervisors may be more accurate when inspections are recent.  Finally, Peek, 
Rosengren, and Tootell (1999a,b) used quarterly data from 1978:Q1-1996:Q2 and 1978:Q1-1994:Q4, 
respectively, and found that the proportion of the nation's banking assets in banks with composite CAMEL ratings 
of 5 (the worst rating) added information in predicting macroeconomic performance beyond what was 
incorporated in the predictions of private-sector forecasting firms and Federal Reserve staff. 
  A fundamental problem with tests of supervisory accuracy is that accuracy in predicting future 
performance may not be the primary goal of supervisors. Supervisors may be more concerned with accurately 
describing the current condition of a BHC in order to exert pressure on institutions to resolve problems, and be 
less concerned with predicting future condition.  Supervisors may be very accurate in assessing current condition 
while appearing to be very inaccurate at predicting future condition, particularly if supervisors are successful at 
pressuring institutions to resolve problems.  For example, a CAMEL downgrade or an increase in classified assets 
may encourage an institution to stop making risky loans, eventually reducing its nonperforming loan ratio.  The 
                                                                                                                                                                  
main purpose.  These studies generally found that the supervisory ratings were far from perfectly predictable from Call 
Report information, consistent with the supervisors adding timely information.  However, these studies are less useful for 
evaluating timeliness than studies using stock and bond market data, since market data presumably incorporate much more 
information than the Call Report.        20 
 
finding in Cole and Gunther (1998) and Berger, Davies, and Flannery (2000) that supervisors may be more 
accurate than market participants in predicting short-run future performance and less accurate than market 
participants in predicting long-run future performance is consistent with this argument, since any change in 
problem loans caused by supervisory pressure is likely to take several quarters to appear in full in the data.  
Because of these difficulties, we do not try to determine whether any increase or decrease in supervisory toughness 
in the data represents a change in accuracy. 
5.  Methodology and Data 
  In this section, we first discuss the method and data used to test Hypotheses H1 and H2, which address 
whether banks received harsher or less harsh supervisory assessments for a given set of bank conditions.  We then 
review our procedures and information used in testing Hypothesis H3, which addresses the effects of changes in 
supervisory harshness on bank lending behavior. 
5.1  Tests of changes in supervisory harshness (Hypotheses H1 and H2) 
  As indicated above, to test for changes in supervisory toughness, we model two types of supervisory 
assessments — classified assets and composite CAMEL ratings — as functions of measures of bank financial 
condition and other factors representing the economic environment of the bank.  The econometric models mimic 
as closely as possible the information used in the supervisory process at the time of the supervisory assessments.  
Of course, it is not possible to include all of the information available to supervisors at the time they set the 
classified assets and CAMEL ratings, but we address this issue as well as we can by: 
 
1.  Including the key balance sheet and income variables specified in the supervisory procedures in their 
level, trend, and peer group percentile ranks, as discussed above; 
 
2.  Including a large number of other control variables for bank condition and economic environment; 
 
3.  “Bracketing” the information set used by supervisors by running the models with and without 
information on the future performance of the bank, which is more information than the supervisors 
could have access to at the time of the supervisory assessments; 
 
4.  Running large numbers of robustness checks on the models. 
 
 
  Our models for classified assets and CAMEL ratings are very similar.  We first review our classified assets 
model in detail and then discuss how the CAMEL model differs.  The classified assets model takes the form:        21 
 
 
ln(CLASS/(1-CLASS)) = f (TIME DUMMIES, LAGGED SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS, 
SUPERVISORY AGENCY DUMMIES, BANK SIZE, BANK 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS, STATE AVERAGES OF 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS, OTHER ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS, [FUTURE PERFORMANCE]) 
 
These variables are shown in various degrees of detail in Table 7.  There are between 190 and 199 coefficients 
estimated in each of the classified assets equations, depending upon whether the future performance variables 
(described below) are included. 
  The dependent variable is in log-odds form, the natural log of the proportion of loans classified as 
substandard, doubtful, or loss divided by one minus this proportion.  The equation may be interpreted as a log-
odds grouped logit model for the probability that a dollar of loans will be classified.  It is estimated by weighted 
least squares in order to avoid heteroskedasticity problems and the adjusted R
2s are corrected.
7  As shown in Table 
7, we specify models for both total classified assets and weighted classified assets. 
  The TIME DUMMIES are also specified in several alternative ways to insure robustness of the results.  In 
some equations, we include dummies for each of our three main time periods, pre-crunch (1986-1988), credit 
crunch (1989-1992), and boom (1993-1998).  In other equations, we specify dummies for each individual year to 
allow for the data more freedom to “choose for themselves” when changes in supervisory toughness occurred.  We 
use the coefficients of the TIME DUMMIES to establish the changes in supervisory toughness.  That is, after 
controlling as well as we can for the supervisors’ information in the rest of the equation, we test the coefficients of 
these dummies to see if classified assets tend to be higher in the credit crunch period as predicted by Hypothesis 
H1, and lower during boom period as predicted by Hypothesis H2. 
  As an additional specification, we drop the TIME DUMMIES and simply run the model separately for the 
pre-crunch, credit crunch, and boom periods, allowing the coefficients of all of the other regressors to change in an 
unrestricted manner.  This gives an alternative way of calculating economic significance by assessing whether the 
predicted values for classified assets differ substantially for a given set of conditions (e.g., the median from one of 
the time periods) using the coefficients from two different time periods. 
  We also include LAGGED SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS to account for “stickiness” in assessments 
                                                 
7 Each observation is divided by a number proportional to the estimated standard error of its error term [{(1/CLASS)) +        22 
 
or additional information inherent about bank or portfolio quality in past assessments. We include the lagged total 
classified assets ratio in the total classified assets regressions and the lagged weighted classified assets ratio in the 
weighted classified assets equation.  We include in both models lagged dummy variables for the last previously 
recorded composite CAMEL rating (lagged CAMEL 4 or 5 is excluded as the base case).   The time since last 
recorded examination may help predict supervisory outcomes because problem banks are typically examined more 
frequently, although a shorter lag may also predict less change in condition, since there is less time for changes in 
condition to occur.  Importantly, we also include data for banks without previous examination records to avoid 
sample selection problems as discussed earlier.  For these observations, we set the dummy for “No lagged 
examination data” to 1, and set the values of the other LAGGED SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENT variables to 
zero.  In effect, we account for the average difference of these banks from other banks. 
  We also include SUPERVISORY AGENCY dummies in the models.  These account for the possibility of 
systematic differences in supervisory standards across government agencies.  They may also reflect systematic 
differences in the quality of banks with different charter types or Federal Reserve membership for which we do not 
otherwise adequately control. 
  The BANK SIZE variables include a continuous measure of bank assets, as well as dummies for different 
size classes.  These control for many differences between large and small banks that may not be otherwise 
controlled for in the model, including the degree of industrial and geographic diversification in the loan portfolio, 
risks from off-balance sheet or international exposures, and any systematic differences in supervisory treatment. 
  The BANK BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS are the levels, trends, and peer group percentile 
ranks of the nine key balance sheet and income variables specified in the UBPR and taken from the appropriate 
Call Report quarter.  These are the Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Leverage Capital Ratio, Real Estate 
Loans/Total Loans, Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Off-balance Sheet Items/Total Loans, Other Real Estate 
Owned/Total Loans, Return on Assets, and Volatile Liability Dependence.  All of these variables are specified in 
both first- and second-order terms and interactions, so that each actually appears nine times in the regressor list to 




2, xit •  (xit-xit-1), xit •  xrankit, and (xit-xit-1) •  xrankit, where xit represents the current value of the variable 
                                                                                                                                                                  
[1/(1-CLASS))]} / total loans]
1/2.        23 
 
computed from the Call Report, (xit-xit-1) is the trend, and xrankit is the current peer group percentile rank, for a 
total of 81 variables specified (means, standard deviations, coefficients not shown in tables). 
  We also include a number of variables to control for the economic environment of the bank.  The STATE 
AVERAGES OF BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS are the same 81 variables as are specified for the 
bank itself, except that they are state averages to help control for the economic environment of the bank  (data not 
shown in tables).  OTHER ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS include regional dummies for the 
Federal Reserve District (which may capture systematic differences in regional economic conditions or supervisory 
treatment) as well as state income growth and unemployment rate. Although the local economic environment is 
not explicitly specified in the examination procedures, it is nonetheless important to control for the environment to 
account for exogenous changes in bank condition that may be reflected in supervisory assessments.  For example, 
supervisors may be more likely to find problems in the loan portfolio and assign more classified assets and a worse 
CAMEL rating for a bank in a state with low income growth, a high unemployment rate, and poor state-average 
bank balance sheet and income items, even after taking into account the bank’s own balance sheet and income 
items.  To the extent that there are changes in the macroeconomic or regional environment that affect all banks in 
the nation or region, these effects may be mostly captured by these state-level variables, since banks were 
generally legally restricted to have full-service banking offices only in their home state for almost all of our 
sample.
8  That is, conditions outside the home state are likely to be much less important than those in the state. 
  Finally, we alternately exclude and include the FUTURE PERFORMANCE variables, which are leads of 
1, 2, and 3 years of nonperforming loans, charge-offs, and the total risk-based capital ratio.  As noted above, it is 
not possible to include all of the information available to supervisors at the time of the supervisory assessments, 
although the variables reviewed thus far represent our best attempt.  One of the ways we attack this problem is to 
include these future values of nonperforming loans, charge-offs, and capital, which capture  more information than 
the supervisors could have had access to at the time of the assessments and represent fairly well the future 
condition of the bank that supervisors are interested in predicting or altering.  In effect, we try to “bracket” the 
information set used by supervisors by running the models alternately with less information and with more 
                                                 
8 Interstate bank branching was essentially prohibited prior to the implementation of the Riegle-Neal Act in 1997.  Bank 
holding companies were permitted to own banks in different states prior to this time, but our data are on the individual banks, 
not their holding companies.        24 
 
information than supervisors have.  If the same qualitative result for changes in supervisory toughness holds when 
we specify both less and more information than supervisors have, then we will feel more confident in drawing 
conclusions about what occurred with their actual (unobserved) information set.  We recognize that the FUTURE 
PERFORMANCE variables are endogenous, that their coefficients are unreliable, and that the model is 
underidentified with their inclusion, but our purpose is to check the robustness of the main model which excludes 
these variables, rather than to rely on equations with the endogenous variables.  Fortunately, the results are robust 
to the inclusion or exclusion of the FUTURE PERFORMANCE variables, supporting our interpretation of the 
time dummies as reflecting changes in supervisory toughness, rather than important excluded variables. 
  We also run the classified asset model (as well as the CAMEL model below) using a Heckman correction 
to deal with potential sample selection problems.  We first run a probit equation for the probability that a bank has 
an exam in a given year, and then include the resulting inverse Mills ratio as a regressor in the equations for the 
classified asset ratios and CAMEL ratings.  We specify a separate probit model for each year to take account of the 
apparent significant changes over time in the probability of an examination.  The variables in these models include 
the same past values of key balance sheet and income variables, past supervisory ratings, etc. that that should 
affect the decision to examine a bank, just as they affect the supervisory rating on a bank.  This creates a problem 
of identification for the Heckman correction, as we have no variables in the first stage for the probability of an 
examination that are not also in the second stage for the supervisory assessments at the examinations. Since we do 
not have any “true” exclusion restrictions, our sample selection correction is identified by 1) the fact that we run 
separate probit equations for each year, letting all the coefficients vary to take account of changes over time in the 
probability of an examination, and 2) the nonlinearity inherent in the inverse Mills ratio.  The use of the same 
underlying variables cannot be helped, since all of the variables that supervisors use in off-site monitoring in 
selecting banks to be examined are also used in their determination of the supervisory assessments at the end of the 
examination.  Fortunately, our main results regarding Hypotheses H1 and H2 are robust to including or excluding 
the Heckman correction.  
  The model for the composite CAMEL ratings is very similar and takes the form: 
 
Probability(CAMEL) = g (TIME DUMMIES, LAGGED SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS, 
SUPERVISORY AGENCY DUMMIES, BANK SIZE, BANK 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS, STATE AVERAGES OF        25 
 
BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS, OTHER ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS, [CLASSIFIED ASSETS], [FUTURE 
PERFORMANCE]) 
 
  This equation is specified as an ordered logit of the choice among composite CAMEL 1, 2, 3, and (4 or 5). 
 As indicated in Table 7, CAMEL 5 is grouped with CAMEL 4 because CAMEL 5 is so rare.  As a robustness 
check, we try running the model with the management (M) component of CAMEL rating in place of the composite 
rating, since the supervisors have a significant amount of discretion in assigning a management rating, with results 
very similar to those for the composite CAMEL.  As an additional check, we rerun the composite CAMEL model 
as a binomial logit for the probability of a satisfactory versus unsatisfactory rating, i.e., a CAMEL rating of 1 or 2 
versus 3, 4, or 5.   
  The regressors specified are identical to those in the classified assets model with one exception.  We run 
the CAMEL model three ways — with current total classified assets included as a regressor, with current weighted 
classified assets included, and with no current classified assets included.  The purposes are to allow the data to 
describe different types of changes in supervisory toughness, and to check robustness of the results.  One way that 
changes in supervisory toughness may affect CAMEL ratings is that supervisors may simply assign a higher or 
lower composite CAMEL grade after an on-site examination for a given evaluation of the loan portfolio, which 
may be described by model with current classified assets specified in total or weighted form.  That is, supervisors 
may take as given the set of classifications for the loan portfolio and assign a harsher or laxer rating.  Alternatively, 
supervisors may assign a harsher or laxer rating CAMEL as part of the same process in which loans are classified 
more or less harshly.  In this case, the specification with no current classified assets specified is correct and the 
models with classified assets specified have endogenous regressors and the associated problems these create.  
Fortunately, the results are robust to the inclusion or exclusion of the current classified assets variables.  
5.2  Tests of changes in supervisory toughness on bank lending behavior (Hypothesis H3) 
  To test for the effects of changes in supervisory toughness on bank lending behavior, we model changes in 
bank lending and other measures of performance as functions of three years of past changes in supervisory 
assessments, and include control variables for three years of other past changes in bank condition and economic 
environment.  Three years of lagged changes are included because it may take a considerable amount of time for a 
bank to change the composition of its loan portfolio.         26 
 
  Our model for change in performance takes the form: 
 
∆ PERFORMANCE  = h (TIME DUMMIES, ∆ SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS (3 years of lags), 
∆ BANK BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS (3 years of lags), 
∆ STATE AVERAGES OF BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS 
(3 years of lags), ∆ STATE AVERAGES OF SUPERVISORY 
ASSESSMENTS (3 years of lags), ∆ OTHER ECONOMIC 
ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS (3 years of lags)) 
 
 The  ∆ PERFORMANCE variables include two types of variables – 1) direct quantitative measures of the 
changes in lending behavior and 2) measures of changes in bank risk.  The direct measures of changes in lending 
behavior are the one-year changes in the ratios of C&I loans, real estate loans, installment loans, and U.S. 
Treasuries to gross total assets (e.g., C&It/GTAt - C&It-1/GTAt-1) as well as the proportional change in gross total 
assets ((GTAt-GTAt-1)/GTAt-1).  Our main tests of Hypothesis H3 are tests that CAMEL downgrades and increases 
in classified assets predict reductions in lending and assets and increases in Treasuries, and vice versa for CAMEL 
upgrades and decreases in classified assets.  
  The measures of changes in bank risk that we include in the ∆ PERFORMANCE variables are the ratios of 
nonperforming loans and charge-offs to gross total assets and the total capital ratio.  These are changes in the 
current values of essentially the same variables alternately included and excluded in the supervisory assessment 
regressions to “bracket” the supervisory information set because these represent fairly well the future condition of 
the bank that supervisors are interested in predicting or altering.  To the extent that changes in supervisory 
toughness affect risk-taking in the predicted direction, then a supervisory downgrade should result in smaller 
nonperforming and charge-off ratios and higher capital ratios, as downgrades are expected to encourage 
institutions to reduce risks (and vice versa for upgrades).  However, to the extent that a supervisory downgrade 
reflects an accurate prediction that existing loans will become nonperforming or be charged off, the predicted 
signs are in the opposite direction.  Similarly, a supervisory downgrade in the form of an increase in classified 
assets may reduce capital as discussed above.  This tension between supervisory assessments as intended to change 
behavior versus predict outcomes is difficult to disentangle, as indicated in the literature review.  The results of 
these regressions should yield some interesting information on the net effect of these opposing forces.  However, 
because of these opposing forces, we do not view the results of the nonperforming, charge-off, and capital        27 
 
regressions as tests of Hypothesis H3. 
  The regressors included in the ∆ PERFORMANCE model are essentially analogous to those in the 
classified assets and CAMEL models, with some exceptions.  One exception concerns the TIME DUMMIES.  We 
include the year dummies, rather than the period dummies to allow maximum flexibility, since these variables are 
not the main focus of attention here.  Data for the year 1986 are dropped and the dummy for 1987 is the base case, 
since the data did not go back far enough to cover the lags needed for 1986.  The remaining variables are 
measured as 3 years of lagged changes to allow time for the bank to adjust its portfolio in reaction to the change in 
supervisory assessments and other changes in bank condition and economic environment.  As additional variables, 
we include state averages of changes in supervisory assessments (average change in classified assets and 
composite CAMEL for banks in the state).  We exclude peer group percentile ranks of the balance sheet and 
income items, since we are investigating the bank’s behavior rather than the supervisor’s behavior.  We also 
exclude the measures of future performance sometimes included in the supervisory assessment equations because 
issues of supervisory information and sample selection are not relevant here.  
  In the specification of the ∆ SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS variables, we specify 3 lags of dummies 
for CAMEL upgrades and downgrades, leaving “no change” as the base case.   This allows for an asymmetric 
response of banks to upgrades and downgrades.  We also run the model alternately with 3 lags of changes in total 
classified assets and with 3 lags of changes in weighted classified assets.  In the interest of brevity, we show only 
the former specification, but the results are robust to this difference in specification.  Finally, classified assets are 
measured here as proportions of assets, rather than as proportions of loans as in the supervisory regressions.  In our 
view, the proportion of assets that are classified is a better indicator of the supervisory pressure on banks to change 
their behavior. 
6.  Empirical Results 
  In this section, we first review the results of the classified assets and CAMEL models that test Hypotheses 
H1 and H2 that supervisory toughness may have changed during the credit crunch and boom periods.  We then 
review the results of the performance models that test Hypothesis H3 that changes in supervisory toughness, if 
they occurred, changed bank lending behavior in the predicted directions.  
6.1  Results of tests of changes in supervisory harshness (Hypotheses H1 and H2)        28 
 
  Table 8 presents the weighted least squares regression equations for classified asset ratios and ordered 
logit regressions for the composite CAMEL rating.  These models include dummies for the main time periods, the 
credit crunch (1989-1992), and boom (1993-1998) periods, with the pre-crunch (1986-1988) period excluded as 
the base case.  Other models include dummies for each individual year to allow the data more freedom to “choose 
for themselves” when changes in supervisory toughness may have occurred.  These models yield similar results, 
but are not shown in the tables.  We also do not show the coefficients for most of the control variables to save 
space.  As indicated above, there are nearly 200 coefficients estimated in each supervisory equation.  The bold-
faced type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, two-sided. 
  To test Hypothesis H1 that supervisors got tougher on banks during the credit crunch period, we test the 
coefficients of the time dummies to see if classified assets tend to be higher and composite CAMEL ratings tend to 
be worse in the credit crunch period than in the pre-crunch period after controlling as well as we can for the 
supervisors’ information in the equations.  We find that the coefficients of the credit crunch dummy (1989-1992) 
in the total classified assets equations in Table 8 are small and statistically insignificant.  For the weighted 
classified assets equations, we find that the coefficients of the credit crunch dummy are larger and statistically 
significant.  These findings hold whether or not the future performance variables (leads of 1, 2, and 3 years of 
nonperforming loans, charge-offs, and total capital) are included in the estimation.  Note that observations from 
the last three years of the sample have to be dropped when the future performance variables are specified.  
  To evaluate whether the classified asset results are economically significant, we evaluate the contributions 
of the credit crunch dummy to the probability that dollar of loans is classified.  Recall that the dependent variable 
in these equations is in log-odds form [ln(CLASS/(1-CLASS))], and may be interpreted as a log-odds grouped 
logit model for the probability that a dollar of loans will be classified.  Since the equation is nonlinear, the 
measured effect will depend on the point of evaluation.  We choose the means of total and weighted classified 
asset proportions during the credit crunch as the most relevant points of evaluation, .072 and .018, respectively 
(see Table 4, Panel B).  Increasing the dependent variable of the total classified assets equation by .005211 (the 
coefficient on the credit crunch dummy) increases the predicted proportion of classified loans from 7.2% to 
7.235%, an economically small effect.
9 Similarly, increasing the dependent variable of the weighted classified 
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assets equation by .046267 increases the predicted weighted classified proportion from 1.8% to 1.884%, which is 
larger, but would still appear to be a small economic influence.  Thus, the data suggest at most a relatively modest 
effect of examiners getting tougher during the credit crunch period in terms of requiring that banks of a given 
condition classify more loans or shifted loans into more serious classifications (e.g., from substandard to doubtful 
or from doubtful to loss, which would raise weighted classified assets). The economic significance results are 
consistent with on the order of magnitude of about 1% or less of the loan portfolio being additionally classified or 
classified more seriously.  
  We turn next to the measured effects on the composite CAMEL rating.  The way the ordered logit 
equations are set up, the negative, statistically significant coefficients on the dummy for the period of 1989-1992 
indicate that the probability of receiving a favorable CAMEL rating is lower than during the pre-crunch period, all 
else held equal.  Again, the effects are comparable, whether or not the future performance variables are included.  
The ordered logit models shown in Table 8 control for the current level of total classified assets.  The results are 
also robust with respect to using current weighted classified assets or to excluding current classified assets 
altogether. 
  It is more difficult to evaluate the economic significance of  the CAMEL results because of the multiple 
choices in the ordered logit equations.  To do so, we compare the predicted values of CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, 
CAMEL 3, and CAMEL 4 or 5 with and without the coefficient of the credit crunch dummy variable.  That is, we 
evaluate the predicted CAMEL ratings as if the coefficients reflect the pre-crunch supervisory regime versus the 
credit crunch supervisory regime.  The point of evaluation is the median of all the variables for the credit crunch 
period except that the dummy variables are set to one or zero.  We assume that the lagged CAMEL rating is a 2 
(the modal rating), the region is 1 (New England), the size class is 1 (assets below $100 million), and that the bank 
was examined by a state supervisory agency (OCC, FDIC, FRB = 0).  As we will see, the lagged CAMEL rating 
dominates the other exogenous variables in determining the current CAMEL rating.  The predicted percentages of 
CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, CAMEL 3, and CAMEL 4 or 5 are [9.37%, 88.91%, 1.70%, 0.001%], respectively, 
without the credit crunch dummy coefficient and [6.89%, 90.74%, 2.36%, 0.002%], respectively, with the credit 
crunch dummy coefficient.  Notably, these results suggest that CAMEL ratings are relatively “sticky” — banks 
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rated as CAMEL 2 in the prior examination are close to 90% likely to receive a 2 during the next examination.  
These results are consistent with only a modest increase in supervisory harshness during the credit crunch period, 
moving the CAMEL ratings for on the order of magnitude of about 3% of banks.  Consistent with the classified 
asset results, the CAMEL results suggest at most a relatively modest increase in supervisory toughness. 
  As noted above, we also rerun the CAMEL model as a binomial logit for the probability of a satisfactory 
versus unsatisfactory rating, i.e., a CAMEL rating of 1 or 2 versus 3, 4, or 5 (not shown in tables).  The results 
again show a statistically significant effect of the credit crunch dummy variable.  The results were also more 
economically significant than the full model – the data suggest that for a given bank condition at the mean of the 
data set, the probability of a satisfactory rating decreased about 9 percentage points (from 74.2% to 65.0%).  Part 
of the difference from our main result may be due in part to the sparser specification of the satisfactory versus 
unsatisfactory rating, and in part to the different point of evaluation. 
  To test Hypothesis H2 that supervisors got easier on banks during the boom period, we use the same 
models and test the coefficients of the time dummies to see if classified assets tend to be lower and CAMEL 
ratings tend to be more favorable in the boom period for a given bank condition and economic environment.  The 
coefficients of the boom period dummy (1993-1998) in the classified assets equations in Table 8 are negative, 
larger in absolute value than the credit crunch period dummies, and statistically significant in all four cases, 
consistent with a reduction in supervisory toughness relative to the pre-crunch period.  More important for 
evaluating Hypothesis H2, boom period dummy coefficients are even further below the positive coefficients of the 
credit crunch period dummy coefficients, consistent with a slightly larger supervisory toughening relative to the 
credit crunch period.  These results are robust to the specification of total or weighted classified assets and whether 
or not the future performance variables are included. 
  To assess the economic significance of  the classified asset results for the boom period, we evaluate the 
contribution to the probability that dollar of loans is classified of the boom period dummy minus the credit crunch 
dummy, which measures the change between these two periods.  Using the same method as above for testing 
Hypothesis H1, we evaluate at the mean proportions of total and weighted classified assets during the boom 
period, .039 and .009, respectively (see Table 4).   Changing the dependent variable of the total classified assets 
equation by (-.16131-.005211)  (i.e., the coefficient on the boom period dummy minus the coefficient on the credit        31 
 
crunch dummy) reduces the predicted proportion of classified loans from 3.9% to 3.322%. Similarly, the predicted 
weighted classified proportion is reduced from 0.9% to 0.737%.  These figures are not economically significant in 
terms of the reduction in the proportion of loans that are predicted to be classified or receive less serious 
classifications, on the order of magnitude of 1% or less of loans in both cases. Thus, the data are consistent with 
rather modest reductions in supervisory toughness during the boom period in terms of classified assets. 
  Turning to the potential effects of changes in supervisory toughness on CAMEL ratings during the boom 
period, we note that the coefficients of the boom period dummy (1993-1998) in the CAMEL models are both 
negative, and the coefficient for the main equation (without the future performance variables) is statistically 
significant.  This suggests that the CAMEL ratings were harsher for a given bank condition in the boom period 
than in pre-crunch period, contrary to the classified assets results.  More important for investigating Hypothesis 
H2, however, is that the boom period dummies are less in absolute value than the coefficients of the credit crunch 
period dummies, so they represent harsher ratings for a given condition than during the credit crunch period. 
  To evaluate whether the CAMEL results for the boom period are economically significant, we again 
compare the predicted values of the CAMEL probabilities.  In this case, we evaluate the predicted probabilities 
with the coefficient of the boom period dummy in place of the credit crunch period dummy, evaluated at the 
median of the variables for the boom period (as well as lagged CAMEL rating 2, region 1, size class 1, and state 
agency examination).  The predicted percentages of CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, CAMEL 3, and CAMEL 4 or 5 are 
[21.98%, 77.39%, 0.63%, 0.004%], respectively, with the credit crunch dummy coefficient specified and [24.96%, 
74.50%, 0.54%, 0.004%], respectively, with the boom period dummy coefficient.  These data suggest that bank 
conditions and economic environments were so strong during the boom period that even banks with lagged 
CAMEL 2 ratings were predicted to have over a 20% probability of rising to a CAMEL 1 rating without any 
change in supervisory toughness.  The effects of any change in supervisory toughness are again rather mild, 
consistent with supervisory easing resulting in improved CAMEL ratings on the order of magnitude of about an 
additional 3% of banks receiving better CAMEL ratings.  The use of the binomial logit model for the probability 
of a satisfactory versus unsatisfactory rating also showed very little effect in this case, moving the predicted 
probability of a satisfactory CAMEL rating during the boom period up by less than 1 percentage point (from 
92.1% to 93.0%).  Consistent with the classified asset results, the CAMEL results suggest at most a relatively        32 
 
modest decrease in supervisory toughness. 
  Overall, the classified assets and CAMEL models are modestly consistent with Hypotheses H1 and H2.  
They generally show statistically significant results in the predicted directions but usually show only fairly small 
results from an economic viewpoint.  In most cases, the findings are consistent with no more than about 1% of 
additional loans becoming classified or put into more serious classifications during the credit crunch period and 
similarly for the reduction in classifications during the boom period, for a given bank condition and economic 
environment.  Similarly, the data are consistent with movements of CAMEL ratings for on the order of 3% of 
banks in the predicted directions as a result of any changes in supervisory toughness, which is small compared 
with the effects of  “stickiness” in ratings during the credit crunch period and the trend toward improved ratings 
from economic conditions during the boom period.  These findings are generally confirmed by a number of 
robustness checks not shown in the tables, including our Heckman correction for sample selection problems. 
  As noted above, we also tried evaluating economic significance by dropping the TIME DUMMIES and 
running the model separately for the pre-crunch, credit crunch, and boom periods, allowing the coefficients of all 
of the regressors to vary.  While this procedure generally mostly yielded the same qualitative results – consistent 
with toughening during the credit crunch period and easing during the boom period – the quantitative results were 
often too large to be believable.  For example, at the boom period medians, the CAMEL models predicted a drop 
from 73.4% to 2.6% in the probability of a CAMEL 3 rating from the credit crunch supervisory regime to the 
boom period regime.  Presumably, these models simply did not work very well out of sample. 
  We briefly discuss the other coefficients shown in Table 8, but again remind the reader that a large 
number of coefficients, mostly the balance sheet and income variables for the bank and their state averages, are not 
shown.  In the classified assets equations, the coefficients of lagged classified assets are positive and statistically 
significant, consistent with the expectation that a prior problem loan portfolio would predict a current problem 
loan portfolio, all else held equal, since it takes a considerable amount of time to dispose of problem assets.  The 
coefficients of the lagged CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, and CAMEL 3 are positive and statistically significant in the 
classified assets equations.  This suggests that a past rating of CAMEL 4 or 5 — the base case in the regressions – 
has a positive effect in encouraging banks to improve their loan portfolios and reduce classified assets relative to 
their lagged levels.  In the CAMEL equations, the positive and statistically significant lagged CAMEL coefficients        33 
 
are consistent with CAMEL “stickiness” – the higher is the past rating, the higher is the predicted current rating.  
As expected, the level of  current total classified assets has statistically significant negative coefficients in the 
CAMEL equations (as does the version of the model with weighted classified assets, not shown), consistent with 
banks with poor loan portfolios receiving poor CAMEL ratings.  However, the lagged classified assets variable has 
a positive coefficient.  Given that the current level of classified assets is in the same equation, this may be 
interpreted as reward (punishment) for improvement (deterioration) in classified assets since the prior 
examination.  The variable for years since a prior examination has negative coefficients in the classified assets 
equations, consistent with banks that have problem portfolios being examined more often, although this does not 
appear to affect the CAMEL rating. The coefficients of the supervisory agency dummies, OCC, FDIC, and FRB, 
suggest that banks examined by the OCC and FDIC received worse supervisory assessments (higher classified 
assets, worse CAMEL ratings) than those examined by the Federal Reserve and state agencies (the base case), all 
else equal.  It is not known the extent to which this reflects differences in supervisory standards versus differences 
in the quality distributions of banks with different supervisors.  Finally, the coefficients of the future performance 
variables generally suggest that banks that are assigned worse supervisory ratings (high classified assets or poor 
CAMEL ratings) will have higher nonperforming loans and charge-offs in the future, but may also raise their 
capital ratios.  As noted, these variables are endogenous, and so we reserve further judgment on them until later, 
when we treat them as endogenous variables. 
6.2  Results of tests of changes in supervisory toughness on bank lending behavior (Hypothesis H3) 
  Table 9 presents results from regressions aimed at addressing Hypothesis H3, the effect of changes in 
supervisory toughness on direct measures of bank lending behavior. As discussed above, we regress changes in 
bank lending on three years of past changes in supervisory assessments and control variables for changes in bank 
condition and economic environment.  The main predictions of Hypothesis H3 are that a supervisory downgrade 
(worsened CAMEL rank, higher classified assets) should result in smaller proportions of assets being devoted to 
loans, a reduction in asset growth, and a larger proportion of assets being devoted to government securities, and 
vice versa for supervisory upgrades. 
  Our regressions appear to explain very little of what drives changes in lending behavior.  The adjusted R-
squared's for the equations in Table 9 are generally less than 5%.  Nonetheless, a number of the changes in        34 
 
supervisory assessments are statistically significant.  The changes in classified assets all have signs that are 
consistent with Hypothesis H3 for all lag lengths, and all but one of these coefficients are statistically significant at 
the 5% level.  That is, an increase in classified assets is associated with decreases in the future C&I loan ratio, real 
estate loan ratio, installment loan ratio, and asset growth ratio, and associated with an increase in the future 
Treasury holdings ratio.  These results are also replicated when changes in weighted classified assets are specified 
in place of total classified assets (not shown).  In addition, we tried rerunning the loan and Treasury ratios with 
different denominators to ensure that the results were not just driven by changes in asset denominator.  We 
specified (C&It-C&It-1)/GTAt-1 and (C&It-C&It-1)/C&It-1) in place of C&It/GTAt - C&It-1/GTAt-1, and so forth for 
the other lending and Treasury ratios, and the results were robust. 
  To determine if the classified assets results are economically significant, we simply sum the coefficients 
on the three lags of the change in classified assets.  Since the equations are linear, this gives the long-run effect of 
a change in classified assets, i.e., the sum of the effect of a change one, two, and three years hence.  The results 
suggest that while the effects of classified assets are consistent and almost always statistically significant, their 
economic impact appears to be rather small.  An increase in classified assets of 1% of assets is predicted to reduce 
the C&I loan ratio, real estate loan ratio, installment loan ratio, and asset growth ratio by 0.08%, 0.14%, 0.11%, 
and 0.72%, respectively, and to increase the Treasury ratio by 0.08% in the long run. 
  In contrast to the consistent but small effects of classified assets, the effects of CAMEL upgrades and 
downgrades on lending are not very consistent.  They sometimes predict changes in lending in the opposite 
direction of what is expected, and the upgrades and downgrades sometimes work in the same direction (i.e., 
differing in the same way from the excluded case of no change in CAMEL).  In most cases, the effects are very 
small, moving the ratios less than 1 percentage point in the long run for a CAMEL upgrade or downgrade.
10  Thus, 
the support for Hypothesis H3 is mixed and weak.  The changes in classified assets are consistent with the 
hypothesis, but are small economically, and the changes in composite CAMEL ratings yield small, inconsistent 
effects. 
  Table 10 presents the regressions for the effects of changes in supervisory assessments on measures of 
changes in bank risk – changes in the nonperforming loan, charge-off, and total capital ratios.  As discussed, these 
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results may be interesting, but because they combine the effects of supervisory assessments on bank behavior with 
predictions of how banks choose to adjust their risks, we do not view these equations as valid tests of Hypothesis 
H3.  The lagged changes in both classified assets and composite CAMEL ratings generally have statistically 
significant coefficients that are consistent with each other.  A supervisory downgrade of either type is followed by 
increases in future problem loans and vice versa for supervisory upgrades.  We interpret these results as suggesting 
a dominance of the predictive ability of the ratings over their effects in persuading banks to change the riskiness of 
their loan portfolios.  That is, a supervisory downgrade predicts an increase in nonperforming loans and charge-
offs that is not fully offset by any changes in bank behavior to reduce their risky lending, likely in part because it 
takes time to resolve existing problem loans.  However, the results are not economically significant – a 1% change 
in classified assets or a CAMEL upgrade or downgrade is predicted to change the nonperforming loan and charge-
off ratios by less than 1 percentage point. 
  The results differ for the change in total capital ratio.  The coefficients of the lagged changes in classified 
assets are statistically significant and predict an increase in future capital, consistent with the possibility that 
supervisory discipline from an increase in classified assets encourages banks to increase their capital ratios, more 
than offsetting the erosion of capital from the change in classification.  These findings are also consistent with the 
possibility that banks may have found it easier to react to supervisory discipline from increases in classified assets 
by changing increasing their capital ratios to cover potential losses than eliminating their problem loans.  However, 
changes in CAMEL ratings appear to have the opposite effect, with downgrades predicting a reduction in capital 
and upgrades predicting an increase in capital.  Once again, all of these changes are economically small. 
7.  Conclusions  
  We investigate the possibility that overall changes in supervisory “toughness” may significantly affect 
bank lending behavior and potentially affect macroeconomic or regional economic health.  Specifically, we test 
three hypotheses about whether U.S. bank supervisors changed their policies and whether these policy changes 
affected bank lending behavior during the credit crunch period of 1989-1992 and the banking boom period of 
1993-1998.  We test these hypotheses using information on the supervisory process, confidential data on CAMEL 
ratings and classified assets from bank examinations, and bank balance sheet and income data over the period 
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1986-1998.  We find that the data provide some support for all three hypotheses.  However, the data also suggest 
that the economic effects of any policy changes are likely to have been quite small, and likely do not explain a 
substantial portion of the wide swings in aggregate bank lending to business during the 1990s. 
  The data provide modest support for Hypothesis H1, that there was an increase in toughness during the 
credit crunch period.  During 1989-1992, banks of a given measured financial condition and economic 
environment had statistically significantly worse CAMEL ratings than in the pre-crunch period of 1986-1988, and 
in some cases also had statistically significantly higher classified assets. 
  Similarly, the data give some support for Hypothesis H2 — that there was a decline in toughness during 
the boom period.  During 1993-1998, CAMEL ratings are estimated to have eased and moved part of the way back 
to their levels of the pre-crunch period for given measured circumstances.  The estimated change in classified 
assets for given measured bank condition and economic environment is comparatively greater.  Classified assets 
are measured to be statistically significantly lower than in either the pre-crunch or credit crunch periods for banks 
in a given economic condition and environment. 
  Despite the statistically significant support for Hypotheses H1 and H2, the data also suggest fairly small 
results in terms of economic significance.  The findings are generally consistent with no more than about 1% of 
additional loans becoming classified or put into more serious classifications during the credit crunch period and 
similarly for the reduction in classifications during the boom period, after controlling for bank condition and 
economic environment.  Similarly, the data are consistent with movements of CAMEL ratings for on the order of 
3% of banks in the predicted directions as a result of any changes in supervisory toughness.  The CAMEL changes 
are small compared with the effects of  “stickiness” in ratings during the credit crunch period (the lagged CAMEL 
rating is very likely to be repeated) and overall improvement in ratings from improved economic conditions during 
the boom period (over 20% of CAMEL 2 banks are predicted to move to a CAMEL 1 based on changes in 
economic condition).  The statistical and economic significance findings are generally confirmed by a number of 
robustness checks, although some of the checks suggested larger economic significance. 
  The data provide mixed support for Hypothesis H3, that changes in supervisory toughness, if they 
occurred, affected bank lending as predicted.  Increases in classified assets are statistically significantly associated 
with decreases in the future C&I loan ratio, real estate loan ratio, installment loan ratio, and asset growth ratio, and        37 
 
with an increase in the future Treasury holdings ratio, all consistent with the hypothesis.  However, our analysis of 
economic significance suggests that these effects are rather small, with an increase in classified assets of 1% of 
assets predicted to change these portfolio ratios by less than 1 percentage point each in the long run, often much 
less than 1 percentage point.  The changes in CAMEL ratings did not appear to have consistent effects on future 
lending behavior, although these effects also appeared to be small. 
  We also tested for the effects of changes in supervisory assessments on measures of changes in bank risk – 
changes in the nonperforming loan, charge-off, and total capital ratios.  These results combine the effects of 
supervisory assessments on bank behavior with predictions of how banks choose to adjust their risks.  The findings 
show that supervisory downgrades in terms of either increases in classified assets or worsened composite CAMEL 
rank tend to predict statistically significantly more future nonperforming loans and charge-offs, and vice versa for 
supervisory upgrades.  These findings are consistent with a dominance of the predictive ability of the ratings over 
their effects in getting banks to change the riskiness of their loan portfolios, likely in part because it takes time to 
resolve existing problem loans.  The results differ for the change in total capital ratio — lagged changes in 
classified assets are statistically significant and predict an increase in future capital, consistent with supervisory 
discipline that encourages banks to increase their capital ratios, more than offsetting any direct reduction in capital 
that may occur from classification.  However, changes in CAMEL ratings appear to have the opposite effect.  As 
with our tests of the main hypotheses, all of the measured effects of changes in supervisory assessments on bank 
risk appear to be small, with a 1% change in classified assets or a CAMEL upgrade or downgrade predicted to 
change the nonperforming loan, charge-off, and capital ratios by less than 1 percentage point. 
  The findings also suggest that to the extent that regulatory changes like modifications of capital standards 
are enforced through the supervisory process by assigning worse CAMEL ratings, these regulatory changes may 
not have much effect on bank lending or portfolio risk, since lending and loan risk do not appear to be influenced 
substantially through changes in CAMEL ratings.  However, these regulatory changes could have strong effects 
through other channels. 
  These findings are subject to a number of caveats.  First, our results of testing changes in supervisory 
toughness (Hypotheses H1 and H2) are subject to bias because we cannot exactly replicate the information used by 
supervisors.  Part of what we measure as changes in supervisory toughness may be systematic changes in bank        38 
 
conditions or economic environment over time that supervisors use, but are not specified in our econometric 
models.  We address this issue in a number of ways, by 1) including using the level, trend, and peer percentile 
rank of the key balance sheet and income variables specified in the supervisory procedures, 2) including a large 
number of other control variables for bank condition and economic environment, 3) “bracketing” the supervisory 
information set using data on future performance, and 4) running many other robustness checks.  The main 
findings results are robust to these procedures, suggesting that bias from excluding important variables is not likely 
to be a significant problem. 
  Our discussant, Steve Cecchetti, correctly points out that the estimated coefficients of our time dummies 
— which we interpret as reflecting changes in supervisory toughness — are highly correlated with macroeconomic 
series, such as industrial production.  This is not surprising, given that the credit crunch period essentially 
corresponds to a macroeconomic recession and the boom period for bank lending essentially corresponds to a 
strong macroeconomic expansion.  That is, the time dummies virtually have to be strongly correlated with 
macroeconomic series if Hypotheses H1 and H2 are true, since these hypotheses predict a supervisory toughening 
during the recession and a supervisory easing during the expansion.  These hypotheses do not specify reasons 
behind the changes in supervisory toughness, so if such changes are caused by supervisory reactions to 
macroeconomic conditions, this is still consistent with the hypotheses.  However, a bias may occur if the 
macroeconomic changes are strongly correlated with significant changes in bank conditions that supervisors 
consider in making supervisory assessments that are left out of our econometric models. While such a bias may 
exist, we do not believe it to be substantial because we control for state income growth, unemployment rate, and 
state-average bank balance sheet and income items.  We expect these state economic environment variables to 
capture most of the effects of macroeconomic changes on banks, since banks mostly operated within their home 
states during the sample.  That is, we do not expect a strong separate and independent effect from conditions 
outside the home state, which are represented by the macroeconomic variables.  As well, we believe that the other 
variables in the econometric models — especially the information on future nonperforming loans, charge-offs, and 
capital used to “bracket” the supervisory information set – are much better proxies for the conditions that 
supervisors consider than are general economic conditions outside the home state. 
  Second, our results of the effects of changes in supervisory toughness on lending and bank risk taking are        39 
 
subject to the possibility that part of the measured effects may reflect the reactions of market participants to 
changes in bank condition or economic environment that are not captured by our control variables, rather than 
changes in supervisory discipline.  The fact that the models explain only a small percentage of the variance in the 
changes in bank lending and the changes in problem loan ratios tends to make this scenario more likely.  However, 
the results of prior research suggest that supervisory assessments do embody some timely and accurate private 
information rather than merely reflecting information known to market participants.  In addition, changes in 
classified assets often have a direct effect on bank lending behavior through changing regulatory capital ratios, so 
it is expected that our findings of small effects of changes in classified assets on lending at least partially reflect 
the effects of changes in supervisory harshness on bank lending behavior. 
  Third, our results are subject to sample selection problems.  The proportion of banks examined each year 
changes quite dramatically over time, and the data suggest that a change in the sample selected for examination 
may alter the quality pool of the banks examined relative to the industry as a whole.  In addition, there may be 
missing observations on examinations that took place at the beginning or end of our data set.  As well, some banks 
drop out of the sample due to mergers and failures, and others enter the sample through the creation of new 
charters.  We deal with these sample selection issues by including a large number of controls for bank quality, by 
including observations even when data for lagged supervisory assessments are missing, and by using a Heckman 
correction for sample selection bias.  REFERENCES 
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 Table 1 
Descriptions of Composite CAMEL Ratings 
 
RATING DESCRIPTION 
1  Institutions in this group are basically sound in every respect; any critical findings or 
comments are of a minor nature and can be handled in a routine manner.  Such institutions 
are resistant to external economic and financial disturbances and more capable of 
withstanding the vagaries of business conditions than institutions with lower ratings.  As a 
result, such institutions give no cause for supervisory concern. 
 
2  Institutions in this group are also fundamentally sound, but may reflect modest weaknesses 
correctable in the normal course of business.  The nature and severity of deficiencies, 
however, are not considered material and, therefore, such institutions are stable and also able 
to withstand business fluctuations quite well.  While areas of weakness could develop into 
conditions of greater concern, the supervisory response is limited to the extent that minor 
adjustments are resolved in the normal course of business, and operations continue 
satisfactorily. 
 
3  Institutions in this category exhibit a combination of financial, operational or compliance 
weaknesses ranging from moderately severe to unsatisfactory.  When weaknesses relate to 
financial condition, such institutions may be vulnerable to the onset of adverse business 
conditions and could easily deteriorate if concerted action is not effective in correcting the 
areas of weakness.  Institutions which are in significant noncompliance with laws and 
regulations may also be accorded this rating.  Generally, these institutions give more cause for 
supervisory concern and require more than normal supervision to address deficiencies.  
Overall strength and financial capacity, however, are still such as to make failure only a 
remote possibility. 
 
4  Institutions in this group have an immoderate volume of serious financial weaknesses or a 
combination of other conditions that are unsatisfactory.  Major and serious problems or 
unsafe and unsound conditions may exist which are not being satisfactorily addressed or 
resolved.  Unless effective action is taken to correct these conditions, they could reasonably 
develop into a situation that could impair future viability, constitute a threat to the interests of 
depositors and/or pose a potential for disbursement of funds by the insuring agency.  A higher 
potential for failure is present but is not yet imminent or pronounced.  Institutions in this 
category require close supervisory attention and financial surveillance and a definitive plan 
for corrective action. 
 
5  This category is reserved for institutions with an extremely high immediate or near term 
probability of failure.  The volume and severity of weaknesses or unsafe and unsound 
conditions are so critical as to require urgent aid from stockholders or other public or private 
sources of financial assistance.  In the absence of urgent and decisive corrective measures, 
these situations will likely require liquidation and the payoff of depositors, disbursement of 
insurance funds to insured depositors, or some form of emergency assistance, merger or 
acquisition. 
 
Source: Commercial Bank Examination Manual, A.5020.1, pp. 3-4: Uniform Financial Institutions Rating 
System, effective 3/84.    
 
Table 2 
        Components of the CAMEL Ratings 
 
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 
Capital Adequacy  A bank's Tier 1, total capital, and leverage ratios in relation to its peer group are the most 
important factors in assigning a preliminary rating.  Peer groups are based on bank asset 
size, number of offices and location in a metropolitan or non-metropolitan area. More 
capital is required for banks with deficiencies in any other area of the examination, 
particularly in asset quality. Examiners also pay close attention to how equity and asset 
growth affect the capital ratios, and look at retained earnings as a ratio of average total 
equity to determine whether a bank's equity growth is through retained earnings or an 
unsustainable outside source, and to the size of the dividend payout. 
 
Asset Quality  The asset quality rating is an indicator of future losses to the bank and affects the ratings 
of other areas of examination, which must be considered in light of their adequacy to 
absorb anticipated losses.  The most important factor in the asset quality rating is the 
bank's weighted classified asset ratio, which is computed as [15%*substandard assets 
+50%*doubtful assets + 100%*loss assets]/[Tier 1 capital + allocation for loan and lease 
losses].  Examiners also consider the level, trend and composition of classified assets and 
nonaccrual and renegotiated loans, loan concentrations, lending policies, and 
effectiveness in monitoring past-due loans, insider loans and the types of risks inherent in 
the bank's on- and off-balance sheet portfolios.. 
 
Management  Management is evaluated on a number of criteria, including compliance with applicable 
laws and regulations, whether there is a comprehensive internal or external review audit, 
internal controls to safeguard bank assets, and systems for timely and accurate 
information.  Examiners also consider the other components of the CAMEL rating, 
shareholder return, and the extent to which the bank is serving all sectors of its 
community. 
 
Earnings  Earnings are assessed for ability to absorb future losses, so this rating is affected by asset 
quality,  a bank's level, trend and relation to peer of net interest income, noninterest 
income, overhead expense and provision for loan and lease losses, extraordinary items, 
additional required provision for loan and lease losses or other nonrecurring items, and 
dividend payouts. 
 
Liquidity  The liquidity rating is a determination of a bank's ease in obtaining money cheaply and 
quickly, and a bank's management of interest rate risk.  Considerations include the bank's 
loan commitments and standby letters of credit, the presence of an "unstable core" of 
funding, access to capital markets, the ratios of federal funds purchased and brokered 
deposits to total assets and the ratios of loans to deposits. 
 
Sensitivity to 
Market Risk  
(since 1997 only) 
Rating is based on based on, but not limited to, assessments of the sensitivity of the 
financial institution's earnings or the economic value of its capital to adverse changes in 
interest rates, foreign-exchange rates, commodity prices, or equity prices, the ability of 
management to identify, measure, monitor, and control exposure to market risk given the 
institution's size, complexity, and risk profile, the nature and complexity of interest-rate 
risk exposure arising from nontrading positions where appropriate, the nature and 
complexity of market-risk exposure arising from trading and foreign operations. 
 




        Classified Asset Categories 
 
COMPONENT DESCRIPTION 
Special Mention  This category includes loans that are potential problems, but that are currently of 
adequate quality.  Loans with inadequate documentation and loans particularly vulnerable 
to a change in economic conditions may be classified as such.  Loans to borrowers with 
deteriorating but still acceptable financials are another example. 
 
Substandard  Loans in this category are judged to have a well-defined weakness that may result in 
losses to the bank if left uncorrected.  Characteristics include significant deviations from 
scheduled payments, delinquency, carried-over debt, numerous extensions or renewals 
without statement of source of repayment, decreased borrower profitability or poor 
borrower cash flow. 
 
Doubtful  Doubtful loans have problems similar to those of substandard loans, but also have a loss 
exposure considered severe enough to jeopardize full collection of the loan highly 
unlikely.  However, the loan is not yet considered a loss due to the possibility of 
mitigating circumstances, such as a proposed merger, capital injection or refinancing 
plans.  A loan should not be classified as doubtful for two consecutive exams, since it is 
assumed the status of the loan should be resolved during the time between exams. 
 
Loss   A loan considered uncollectible is classified a loss.  Although some probability of partial 
recovery may exist, it is considered preferable to write off the loan in the current period.  
Such loans are characterized by severe delinquency. 
 
Source: Commercial Bank Examination Manual.    
 






















1986  6042 0.098 0.028 2.402 0.152 0.480 0.217 0.117 0.034 
1987  6763 0.086 0.024 2.291 0.177 0.515 0.182 0.093 0.034 
1988  7729 0.082 0.022 2.257 0.188 0.521 0.170 0.089 0.033 
1989  8352 0.082 0.022 2.216 0.206 0.525 0.153 0.077 0.039 
1990  8316 0.072 0.018 2.207 0.207 0.519 0.165 0.078 0.031 
1991  8377 0.070 0.017 2.194 0.202 0.523 0.178 0.075 0.023 
1992  9040 0.063 0.015 2.089 0.215 0.566 0.149 0.056 0.014 
1993  9594 0.051 0.012 1.869 0.297 0.580 0.088 0.029 0.007 
1994  8867 0.041 0.010 1.758 0.346 0.575 0.058 0.016 0.005 
1995  7821 0.036 0.008 1.676 0.396 0.547 0.045 0.010 0.002 
1996  7273 0.033 0.008 1.609 0.445 0.509 0.037 0.007 0.001 
1997  6381 0.033 0.008 1.591 0.467 0.488 0.036 0.009 0.001 























Pre-crunch  20534 0.088 0.024  2.311 0.174  0.507  0.187 0.098 0.034 
Credit  crunch  34085 0.072 0.018  2.175 0.208  0.534  0.161 0.071 0.026 





















Fraction CAMEL 1 Fraction CAMEL 2 Fraction CAMEL 3
Fraction CAMEL 4 Fraction CAMEL 5
    
 
 
Table 5: Sample Selection – Examined Banks versus the Industry over Time 
 
Panel A 
Year  Number of Banks  Total Capital Ratio  Nonperforming Loan Ratio 
 Examined  Industry  Fraction 
Examined 
Examined Industry Difference Examined Industry Difference 
1986  6042  14197  0.426 0.154  0.178 -0.024 0.061  0.057  0.004 
1987  6763  13956  0.485 0.157  0.177 -0.019 0.057  0.057  0.001 
1988  7729  13443  0.575 0.170  0.185 -0.015 0.050  0.049  0.000 
1989  8352  12863  0.649 0.173  0.185 -0.012 0.044  0.044  0.001 
1990  8316  12447  0.668 0.178  0.186 -0.008 0.043  0.042  0.000 
1991  8377  12088  0.693 0.169  0.177 -0.008 0.043  0.043  0.001 
1992  9040  11677  0.774 0.169  0.178 -0.009 0.042  0.042  0.000 
1993  9594  11232  0.854 0.179  0.186 -0.007 0.033  0.034 -0.001 
1994  8867  10778  0.823 0.183  0.191 -0.008 0.029  0.029  0.000 
1995  7821  10266  0.762 0.184  0.191 -0.007 0.026  0.025  0.000 
1996  7273  9760  0.745 0.182  0.193 -0.011 0.027  0.027  0.000 
1997  6381  9346  0.683 0.131  0.137 -0.005 0.028  0.028  0.000 
1998  5578  8954  0.623 0.173  0.192 -0.018 0.026  0.026  0.001 
 
Panel B 
Period  Number of Banks  Total Capital Ratio  Nonperforming Loan Ratio 
  Examined Industry  Fraction 
Examined 
Examined Industry Difference  Examined  Industry  Difference 
Pre-crunch  20534  41596 0.494  0.161 0.180  -0.019  0.055 0.054 0.001 
Credit  crunch  34085  49075 0.695  0.172 0.181  -0.009  0.043 0.043  -0.000 
Boom  45514  60336 0.754  0.174 0.182  -0.008  0.028 0.028 0.000 
    
Table 6: Changes Between Examinations in CAMEL  Ratings and Classified Asset Ratios 
Panel A 




Year Number  of 
Banks 
Upgrades  Downgrades   Constant  Decreases  Increases  Decreases  Increases 
1986 472  0.131 0.119  0.750  0.523  0.477  0.511  0.489 
1987 3816 0.187  0.155  0.658  0.583  0.417  0.591  0.409 
1988 5426 0.161  0.168  0.672  0.576  0.424  0.586  0.414 
1989 7258 0.157  0.158  0.685  0.554  0.446  0.563  0.437 
1990 7905 0.127  0.175  0.698  0.526  0.474  0.533  0.467 
1991 8072 0.135  0.171  0.694  0.513  0.487  0.522  0.478 
1992 8729 0.182  0.113  0.706  0.557  0.443  0.564  0.436 
1993 9364 0.230  0.060  0.710  0.675  0.325  0.678  0.322 
1994 8777 0.182  0.063  0.755  0.701  0.299  0.691  0.309 
1995 7754 0.164  0.067  0.769  0.645  0.355  0.643  0.357 
1996 7194 0.149  0.066  0.784  0.589  0.411  0.575  0.425 
1997 6277 0.127  0.079  0.794  0.576  0.424  0.568  0.432 










Examined Upgrades Downgrades   Constant  Decreases  Increases  Decreases  Increases 
Pre-crunch 9714  0.170  0.160  0.670  0.576  0.424  0.584  0.416 
Credit crunch  31964  0.151  0.153  0.696  0.538  0.462  0.545  0.455 




Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics for Supervisory Assessment Regressions 
            
Name  Definition       Mean  Std. Dev. 
           
   SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS OF BANK CONDITION 
           
Total Classified Assets  Proportion of loans classified as substandard, 
doubtful or loss. 
.060 .065 
           
Weighted Classified Assets 
 
Weighted proportion of loans classified, weights of 
.2 on substandard, .5 on doubtful, and 1 on loss. 
.015 .020 
 
    
CAMEL 1  Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 1.   .275  .447 
    
CAMEL 2  Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 2.  .521  .500 
 
      
CAMEL 3 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 3.  .128  .334 
      
CAMEL 4 or 5 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 4 
or a 5 (combined because there were so few 5s).  
.075 .264 
      
CAMEL SATISFACTORY  Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 
1or a 2. 
.797 .403 
 
      
CAMEL UNSATISFACTORY      
   
Dummy variable equal to 1 if CAMEL rating is a 3, 
4, or 5. 
.203 .143 
 
      
   TIME DUMMIES   
           
1986-1988   Pre-Crunch Period.  This is excluded as the base 
period in the regressions. 
.216 .412 
           
1989-1992   Credit Crunch Period.  .370  .483 
           
1993-1998  Banking Boom Period.  .414  .493 
    
Individual Year dummies   Included in some regressions.     
      
  LAGGED SUPERVISORY ASSESSMENTS  
    
Lagged Total Classified Assets, 
Weighted Classified Assets, 
CAMEL 1, CAMEL 2, CAMEL 3 
Lagged values of supervisory assessments for banks 
with prior examination data, set to zero otherwise 
(see no lagged examination data variable). 
  
      
Time Since Last Recorded 
Examination 
Years since last recorded examination, set to zero if 
no prior data (see no lagged examination data 
variable). 
      .994       .701 
 
      
No Lagged Examination Data  Dummy variable equal to 1 if no lagged 
examination data are available. 







         
 
                 Table 7 (continued) 
Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
Name  Definition       Mean  Std. Dev. 
   












Dummy variable equal to 1 if the OCC was the                      .248                        .432 
lead agency in the exam. 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the FDIC was the                     .366                       .482 
lead agency in the exam. 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if the FRB was the                       .078                       .268 
lead agency in the exam. 
 
Dummy variable equal to 1 if State Agency or                       .308                        .461 
Other Federal agency.  This is excluded as the 
Base case. 
   
   BANK SIZE VARIABLES 
 
Ln(GTA)  Natural log of Gross Total Assets.      11.039              1.221 
  
    
SIZE1  Dummy variable equal to 1 if GTA≤  $100 million 
(excluded from regressions as base case).  
.723 .448 
      
SIZE2  Dummy variable equal to 1 if  $100 million < GTA 
≤   $1 billion. 
.245 .430 
        
SIZE3  Dummy variable equal to 1 if  $1 billion < GTA ≤   
$10 billion. 
.028 .164 
      
SIZE4  Dummy variable equal to 1 if  $10 billion < GTA.   
  
.004 .065 
  BANK BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS 
           
  Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, 
Leverage Capital Ratio, Real Estate 
Loans/Total Loans, Nonperforming 
Loans/Total Loans, Off-balance Sheet 
Items/Total Loans, Other Real Estate 
Owned/Total Loans, Return on Assets, and 
Volatile Liability Dependence.  All are lagged 
and all are included as level, trend, and peer 
group percentile rank. 
  
              
 
  Table 7 (continued) 
      Variable Definitions and Sample Statistics 
 
 
                   Name                              Definition                                    Mean                        Std. Dev.   
    
 
STATE AVERAGES OF BALANCE SHEET AND INCOME ITEMS TORS 
 
  State averages of the same variables as the 
bank balance sheet and income items.  These 
variables are also lagged and all are included as 
level, trend, and peer group percentile rank. 
  
           
   
OTHER ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENT INDICATORS 
           
  Regional Dummies, State Income Growth and 
State Unemployment Rate. 
  
           
  FUTURE PERFORMANCE 
           
Future Nonperforming Loans  Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included in 
regressions.  Mean for lead 1 shown. 
.038 .036 
           
Future Charge-offs  Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included in 
regressions.  Mean for lead 1 shown. 
.005 .035 
      
Future Total Capital Ratio  Leads of 1, 2, and 3 years included in 
regressions.  Mean for lead 1 shown. 
.169 .078  
Table 8 
Regressions of Supervisory Assessments with Period Dummies 
  Total Classified Assets  Weighted Classified Assets  CAMEL 
Variable  Estimate  Std. Error  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
1989-1992 0.005211  0.017926  0.01003  0.018817  0.046267  0.018059  0.057193  0.018726  -0.3355  0.0418  -0.1979  0.0489 
1993-1998  -0.16131  0.030755  -0.13853  0.033097  -0.15451  0.030464  -0.11518  0.032515  -0.1695  0.0719 -0.1268  0.0863 
Lagged classified assets  10.29125  0.112903  8.977898  0.12419  25.51462  0.400763  21.73203  0.435849  10.9414  0.3002  10.4541  0.3654 
Lag CAMEL1  0.47908  0.028467  0.42174  0.03119  0.103299  0.029719  0.084658  0.032084  6.2138  0.0674  6.1182  0.0823 
Lag CAMEL2  0.699025  0.026069  0.60777  0.02823  0.405948  0.027581  0.339049  0.029372  3.6971  0.0609  3.6969  0.0731 
Lag CAMEL3  0.543288  0.023706  0.464806  0.025212  0.385124  0.025478  0.334712  0.026676  1.9102  0.052  1.9106  0.0618 
Years since last exam  -0.16398  0.005336  -0.09785  0.007457  -0.1304  0.00555  -0.06696  0.007341 0.018  0.0143 -0.00672  0.0192 
No prior exam  0.744434  0.031395  0.806143  0.034212  0.283331  0.032533  0.359236  0.034756  4.4846  0.0766  4.5068  0.0919 
OCC  0.159995  0.010574  0.168187  0.013095  0.151008  0.010116  0.154065  0.012467  -0.2793  0.0242  -0.3743  0.0318 
FDIC  0.11576  0.007679  0.14295  0.008797  0.115969  0.007836  0.15533  0.008961  -0.3258  0.0208  -0.3874  0.0259 
FRB  -0.00341  0.014849  0.008097 0.016897  0.024116  0.01436 0.024877 0.016248 -0.1479  0.0347  -0.1559  0.0431 
Total classified assets                  -82.938  0.6564  -85.358  0.8218 
NPF, t+1      2.797067  0.194073     3.352305  0.214042     -0.00768  0.9653 
NPF, t+2      0.559802  0.201674     0.965655  0.217772     -1.4128  0.9934 
NPF, t+3      0.549363  0.173385     -0.27295  0.188366     -4.2268  0.8816 
Charge-offs, t+1      1.293406  0.192597     1.68188  0.224471     -20.087  1.9758 
Charge-offs, t+2      2.142689  0.335742     2.430947  0.397049     -0.4434  2.0324 
Charge-offs, t+3      0.611406  0.21981     -0.00928  0.184508     3.9199  2.1816 
Total Capital, t+1     0.454978  0.116291     0.126771  0.148643     2.1243  0.4814 
Total Capital, t+2     0.576912  0.123038     0.917427  0.157945     -1.2946  0.4949 
Total Capital, t+3     -0.04714  0.095274     -0.36475  0.118142     -0.2707  0.3772 
                       
Adj. R-sq  0.5202   0.5312    0.5027   0.5182          
Obs  107395   67425    107395   67425   107396   67426  
-2 Log L                  101354.96   64756.72  
 
All of these regressions also include the following variables from the bank’s Call Report: Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Leverage Capital Ratio, Real Estate Loans/Total Loans, 
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Off-balance Sheet Items/Total Loans, Other Real Estate Owned/Total Loans, Return on Assets, and Volatile Liability Dependence.  All are lagged and all 
are included as level, trend, and peer group percentile rank.  State averages of all of these items (lagged levels, trends, and peer group percentile ranks).   State Income Growth and the State 
Unemployment Rate are also included in all regressions. 
 
The bold-faced type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, two-sided.    
Table 9 
 
Regressions of Changes in Lending and Assets on Lagged Changes in Supervisory Assessments and Other Variables  
 
  ∆∆∆∆ C&I loans  ∆∆∆∆ Real Estate loans  ∆∆∆∆ Installment loans  ∆∆∆∆ U.S. Treasuries  ∆∆∆∆ Gross Total Assets 
Variable  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err.  Estimate  Std. Err. 
1988  -0.0015 0.00114 0.002607 0.001653 0.002231 0.001008  0.012822  0.001729  -0.09668 0.014974 
1989  -0.00293 0.000906  0.003247  0.001313  0.002629 0.000801  0.01308  0.001374  -0.08817 0.011897 
1990  -0.00249 0.000978 0.001078 0.001418 0.002106 0.000865  0.021528  0.001484  -0.07921 0.012847 
1991  -0.00547 0.000868  0.002569  0.001257  -0.00152 0.000767  0.023579  0.001316  -0.08796 0.011391 
1992  -0.00351 0.000899  0.00462  0.001302  -0.00242 0.000795  0.027741  0.001363  -0.06352 0.011802 
1993  -0.00224 0.000932  0.004634  0.001351 0.000208 0.000824 0.023088  0.001413  -0.071 0.012238 
1994 -0.00119 0.000897  0.003448  0.0013  0.00389 0.000793  0.026555  0.00136  -0.0726 0.011779 
1995  0.002087 0.000916 0.002035 0.001327 0.004961 0.00081  0.011197  0.001389  -0.06194 0.012027 
1996  0.001892 0.000878  0.002887  0.001273  0.003276 0.000777  0.01199  0.001332  -0.05113 0.011532 
1997  0.002663 0.000926  0.011934  0.001342  0.00199 0.000819 0.000216 0.001404 0.017994 0.012157 
1998  0.002332 0.000816  0.01318  0.001182 0.00018 0.000721  -0.00477  0.001237  0.070603 0.010709 
              
CAMEL upgrade, t-1  -0.00437 0.000354  -0.00178  0.000514  -0.00347 0.000313  0.002534  0.000537 -0.00173 0.004653 
CAMEL upgrade, t-2  -0.00057 0.000363  -0.00346  0.000526 -0.00023 0.000321 0.000831  0.00055 -0.01895 0.004763 
CAMEL upgrade, t-3  0.000158 0.000357  -0.00091  0.000518 0.000357 0.000316 -0.00016 0.000542 -0.00329 0.004692 
            
CAMEL downgrade, t-1  -0.00088 0.000432  0.010906  0.000625  0.001593 0.000382  -0.0027  0.000654  0.060737 0.005666 
CAMEL downgrade, t-2  -0.00137 0.000447  -0.00258  0.000647 0.000706 0.000395 0.003478  0.000678  -0.03283 0.005867 
CAMEL downgrade, t-3  -0.00137 0.000444  -0.00147  0.000644 -0.00046 0.000393 0.002855  0.000674  -0.0222 0.005835 
              
Change in total classified assets, t-1  -0.02704 0.003844  -0.08794  0.005569  -0.05641 0.003398  0.037958  0.005828  -0.39303 0.050464 
Change in total classified assets, t-2  -0.0421 0.003973  -0.03533  0.005757  -0.03303 0.003513  0.028004  0.006024  -0.14216 0.052161 
Change in total classified assets, t-3  -0.01597 0.003834  -0.01775  0.005555  -0.01677 0.00339 0.009414 0.005813 -0.18002 0.050334 
             
Adj  R-sq  0.0309 0.0366   0.0202 0.0449   0.0194 0.0309 
Obs  79960 79960   79960 79960   79960 79960 
 
All of these regressions also include three years of lagged changes of the following balance sheet variables: Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Leverage Capital Ratio, Real Estate Loans/Total 
Loans, Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Off-balance Sheet Items/Total Loans, Other Real Estate Owned/Total Loans, Return on Assets, and Volatile Liability Dependence.  Three years of lagged 
changes of the state averages of all of these items as well as three years of lagged changes of state averages of CAMEL and total classified assets, State Income Growth and the State Unemployment Rate 
are also included in all regressions. 
 
The bold-faced type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, two-sided.     
Table 10 
 
Regressions of Changes in Performance on Lagged Changes in Supervisory Assessments and Other Variables  
 
  ∆∆∆∆ Nonperforming Loans  ∆∆∆∆ Charge-offs  ∆∆∆∆ Total Capital 
Variable  Estimate Std.  Err. Estimate Std.  Err. Estimate Std.  Err. 
1988 -0.0008  0.000505  -0.00086  0.000391 0.011116  0.001117 
1989 -0.00066  0.000401  3.41E-05  0.00031 0.012442  0.000888 
1990  -0.00039 0.000433 -0.00019 0.000335 0.00857  0.000959 
1991  -0.00031 0.000384 0.000207 0.000297 0.013028  0.00085 
1992  -0.0009  0.000398 0.000461 0.000308 0.016657  0.000881 
1993  -0.00048 0.000412  -4.9E-06 0.000319 0.014444  0.000913 
1994  -0.0004 0.000397 6.26E-05 0.000307 0.010648  0.000879 
1995  4.54E-05 0.000405 0.000406 0.000314 0.009896  0.000898 
1996  -0.00024 0.000389 0.000339 0.000301 0.00954  0.000861 
1997  -0.00027  0.00041 0.000221 0.000317 -0.02143  0.000907 
1998  -0.00072  0.000361 0.000211 0.000279 0.014723  0.000799 
          
CAMEL upgrade, t-1  -0.00108  0.000157  -0.00044  0.000121 0.006821  0.000347 
CAMEL upgrade, t-2  -0.00062  0.00016  -0.00036  0.000124 0.001418  0.000355 
CAMEL upgrade, t-3  -0.00066  0.000158  -0.00042  0.000122 4.66E-05 0.00035 
          
CAMEL downgrade, t-1  0.001639  0.000191  0.001638  0.000148 -0.00736  0.000423 
CAMEL downgrade, t-2  0.000592  0.000198  0.000402  0.000153 -0.00022 0.000438 
CAMEL downgrade, t-3  -0.00051  0.000197  -0.00068  0.000152 0.001562  0.000435 
           
Change in total classified assets, t-1  0.083329  0.0017  0.026872  0.001317 0.03454  0.003766 
Change in total classified assets, t-2  0.019455  0.001757  0.011038  0.001361 0.016247  0.003892 
Change in total classified assets, t-3  -0.00539  0.001696  -0.00696  0.001313 0.013343  0.003756 
           
Adj R-sq  0.0882   0.0226   0.4184  
Obs  79959   79960   79960  
 
All of these regressions also include three years of lagged changes of the following variables: Total Capital Ratio, Tier 1 Capital Ratio, Leverage Capital Ratio, Real Estate Loans/Total Loans, 
Nonperforming Loans/Total Loans, Off-balance Sheet Items/Total Loans, Other Real Estate Owned/Total Loans, Return on Assets, and Volatile Liability Dependence. Three years of lagged changes of 
the state averages of all of these items as well as three years of lagged changes of state averages of CAMEL and total classified assets, State Income Growth and the State Unemployment Rate are also 
included in all regressions. 
 
The bold-faced type indicates statistical significance at the 5% level, two-sided.  